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No. 7770 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT V. TILLER, also known as Robert V. 
Tillier, also known as ROBERT V. SWANN!.-:~ 
and MILDRED MOLINARI, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
---·- -- ·- ---~ 004 LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. NORTON, 
administrator of the Estate of CHARLES 
CARSON, al~so known as H. F. SWANN, also 
known as R. C. TILLER, also known as 
ROBERT C. TILLER, deceased, and THE 
ElVIPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE 
CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation, and 
E. LeROY SHIELDS, as executor of the Estate 
of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, and E. 
LEROY SHIELDS, 
- u ~ ·,, ,- ~·ne Court, Ut!}h. 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA NORTON, wife 
of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HAZELRIGG 
and CATHEDRAL OF THE MAGDALENE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF East South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, also known as ROMAN 
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
a corporation sole, 
Cross-Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
433 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
W. D. BEATIE, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT V. TILLER, also known as Robert V. 
Tillier, also known as ROBERT V. SWANN, \ 
and l\IILDRED MOLINARI, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. NORTON, 
administrator of the Estate of CHARLES 
CARSON, also known as H. F. SWANN, also 
known as R. C. TILLER, also known as 
ROBERT C. TILLER, deceased, and THE 
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE 
CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation, and 
E. LeROY SHIELDS, as executor of the Estate 
of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, and E. 
LEROY SHIELDS, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA NORTON, wife 
of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HAZELRIGG 
and CATHEDRAL OF THE MAGDALENE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF East South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, also known as ROMAN 
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
a corporation sole, 
Cross-Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
THE FACTS 
No. 7770 
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Robert V. Tiller, 
also known as Robert V. Tillier, also known as Robert V. 
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Swann and Mildred Molinari, from a Decree in favor of 
the defendants and against the plaintiffs, no cause of 
action. 
This action was commenced by the plaintiffs filing an 
action against Loren G. Norton, Loren G. Norton, ad-
Ininistrator of the Estate of Charles Carson, also known 
as H. F. Swann, also known as R. C. Tiller, also known as 
Robert C. Tiller, deceased, and The Employers Liability 
Assurance Corporation, Ltd., the latter being the bonds-
man of Loren G. Norton the administrator. (R. 1). Plain-
tiffs then filed an amended complaint with leave of court 
(R. 23) to which complaint answers were filed by the 
respective defendants and a cross complaint was then 
filed wit~ leave of court by the defendant, The Employ-
ers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., against Loren 
G. Norton, Gloria Norton, wife of Loren G. Norton, Edith 
M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the Magdalene Catholic 
Church of East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
also known as Roman Catholic Bishop Salt Lake City, 
a corporation so1e. (R. 58). By reason of the: filing of the 
cross complaint, plaintiffs then with leave of court filed 
a second amended complaint (R. 72), adding as party 
defendants E. LeRoy- Shields, as executor of the Estate 
of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased and E. Le·Roy 
Shields. Answers were then filed by the· defendants to 
plaintiffs' second amended complaint (The Employe-rs 
Liability Assurance C'Orporation R. 101) (E. LeRoy 
Shields, executor R. 115) (Loren G. Norton R. 141) and 
trial was had upon the same. 
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In this brief "·e shall refer to the parties as follo\v~: 
Robert ''""· Tiller and 1\lildred ~[olinari-plaintiffs 
Loren G. Norton-administrator 
The En1ployers' Liability .. A.ssurance Corporation 
E. LeRoy Shields-executor. 
The complaint alleges in substance that the plain-
tiffs are residents of Chicago, Illinois and that defendant, 
Loren G. Norton, is a resident of Salt Lake County and 
was the duly appointed qualified and acting administra-
tor of the Estate of Charles Carson, etc. and that the de-
fendant, The Employers Liability Assurance Corpora-
tion, Ltd., is a corporation of Great Britain, authorized 
to do business in the State of Utah, and that E. LeRoiJ 
Shields is the duly qualified, and acting executor of the 
Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased. 
That one Charles Carson died intestate in Salt Lake 
City, "Ctah, on the 8th day of October, 1948, a resident 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, and is referred to in the com-
plaint at all later times either as H. F. Swann, Henry 
F. Swann, R. C. Tiller, also known as Robert C. Tiller. 
That the plaintiffs are the children and issue of the 
marriage of one Maydie Sherman and R. C. Tiller and 
that for many years prior to 1922, the· plaintiffs and 
Maydie Sherman Tiller, their mother, and R. C. Tiller, 
their father, resided at Vetal, South Dakota where: R. C. 
Tiller was known as H. F. S-wann, or Henry F. Swann. 
That in May of 1922, Maydie Tiller, the mother of plain-
tiffs was forced to leave R. C. Tille.r, by reason of cruel 
treatment and left the family ranch at Vetal, South Da-
kota, and sought residence at Chicago, Illinois and that 
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shortly thereafter, R. C. Tiller did likewise take residence 
at Chicago, Illinois. That Maydie Tiller, the mother of 
plaintiffs, divorced R. C. Tiller at Chicago, Illinois, on 
the 11th day of July, 1924 and that R. C. Tiller remained 
absent from his family, the plaintiffs, from 1924 until 
the date of his death and that the plaintiffs between 
1924 and July 7, 1950, were never informed of the loca-
tion of their father or his address, but that he had gone 
under an assumed name of Charles Carson and so did 
business in Salt Lake City, Utah, until the date of his 
death on October 8, 1948; that Charles Carson was buried 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 12th day of October, 1948, 
and left an estate appraised at $28,620.99. That on the 
11th day of October, 1948, one Dr. Howard T. Anderson, 
a preferred creditor of Charles Carson, deceased, did 
file a joint petition for letters of special administration 
and administration and designated that one Grace 
Catherine Sweney Carson was the widow of the decedent, 
(Ex. L-1) and that the Hon. Roald A. Hogenson did on 
the 11th day of October, grant letters of special admini-
stration to Tracy Collins Trust Company; that on the 
13th day of October, Grace Catherine Carson filed a 
petition for probate of said estate (Ex. S-1) alleging 
that Charles Carson left surviving the following heirs 
at law: "Grace Catherine Carson, your petitioner herein 
and no other presently known heirs at law." 
On October 14, 1948, Tracy Collins Trust Company, 
special administrator, filed a petition allegeing that 
Charles Carson was also known as H. F·. Swann, also 
known as Henry F. Swann, and that the title should be 
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so runended and tha.t decedent had two ehild.ren by Inar-
riage, nalnely Robert v. S\\Ta.nn and l\f rs. l\lildred s,vann 
~Iolanari, "Tho 'Yere last heard of at l ~hicago, Illinois in 
the year 1944. Notice of hearing' on letters of admini-
stration 'Yere then 1nailed on the petition of Dr. Anderson 
to Grace Catherine Sweney Carson at 2300 South State 
Street, Salt Lake County, Utah, Robert V. Swann, Chi-
cago, illinois and ~Irs. l\Iildred S·wann Molanari, Chicago, 
illinois on the 16th day of October, 1948. (Ex. L-1). On 
the :21st day of October, 1948, Grace Carson filed an 
objection to the petition of Dr. Anderson for letters and 
alleged ~~That decedent had relatives in the State of Ari-
zona the exact denomination is not familiar to the Protes-
tant but that said Protestant is now making inquiry to 
determine 'vho such relatives and heirs are." (Ex. L-1). 
On December 21, 1948, Dr. Anderson filed an amended 
petition for letters of administration, setting forth that 
his information, since the filing of his original petition, 
is that Grace Catherine Sweney Carson was not the 
widow of the decedent and that the heirs a.t law were 
Robert V. Swann and Mrs. Mildre·d Swann Molana.ri, of 
Chicago, Illinois. On the 6th day of May, 1949, Tracy 
Collins filed a petition further amending the title of 
the deceased by adding R. C. Tiller and Robert C. Tiller. 
On June 7, 1949, Grace Carson filed an amended petition 
for probate, alle:ging, "that he left him surviving the fol-
lowing heirs at law, Grace Catherine Carson, your peti-
tioner herein and no other p·resently known heirs at law." 
On the 1st day of April, 1949, Neil O'Donnell, filed a 
petition as a p·referred creditor, asking the appointment 
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of Tracy Collins Trust Company and alle·ged that Robert 
V. Swann and Mildred Swann Molanari were the heirs 
at law. (Ex. 19). By order of court the petitions filed 
by Dr. Anderson, Grace Carson and Neil O'Donnell were. 
consolidated for hearing and various hearings were had 
thereon at which the testimony of Mr. Beless, the assist-
ant trust officer of the special administrator was adduced 
as to what progress was made by letters and inquiries as 
to the whereabouts of the plaintiffs and the total sum 
of $25.00 was authorized for search of the plaintiffs, by 
the court. At one of these hearings Grace CatheTine Car-
son testified as to he·r marriage in South Dakota, 25 or 
30 years before to the decedent and that they had lived 
as husband and wife to the de-ath of the decedent. 
That on the 11th day of June, 1949, the Hon. Jos. G. 
Jeppson did make an oral decision appointing Loren G. 
Norton, the designee of Grace Carson, the administrator 
of the Charles Carson Estate. That a printed form Order 
appointing Loren G. Norton as administrator was signed 
by the Hon. J os. G. Jeppson on the 20th day of June, 
1949, and on the same day, letters of administration were 
filed by Loren G. Norton and a corporate surety bond in 
the sum of $22,000.00 was filed by the defendant, The 
ErnployeTs Liability Assurance Corporation. 
Tracy Collins in accordance with the~ Order of Judge 
Jeppson filed its first and final account as special ad-
ministrator on July 7, 1949, requesting instructions of 
the court as to whether or not the assets of the estate 
should be turned over to Loren G. Norton until such tin1e 
as Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
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'vere entered on the n1atter of the appoint1nent of the ad-
ministrator in the eause. That on the 2~nd day of July, 
1949, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson did file Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of La'"" and Decree, appointing Loren 
G. Norton as administrator of the Estate of Charles 
Carson and did make the following findings: 
'"2. That said petitioner and said decedent 
owned a store in Salt Lake City, Utah, the name 
of 'vhich was Carson and Carson; that both 
worked in the store, both transacted the business 
and the business was conducted as a partnership·, 
and was so run for a period of thirteen years; that 
many people in Salt Lake City, Utah, kne.w the 
said Mr. and Mrs. Charles Carson for a period of 
over thirty years, and who knew them as man and 
wife, and that they lived together as man and 
wife; that all business that has been conducted 
between said parties, Charles Carson and Grace 
Catherine Carson, was conducted by both of said 
parties and in the business affairs of the~ pHrties, 
each was recognized as an owner therein and that 
they consulted together in relation to said busi-
ness matters, and that during all of said time, they 
lived together, cohabited together as man and 
wife, and that the said Charles Carson, also 
known as H. F. Swann, also known as Henry F'. 
Swann, also known as R. C. Tiller, also known as 
Robert C. Tiller, always obtained pe!rmission from 
Grace Catharine Carson in all business deals that 
were transacted within the knowledge of them, 
and the witnesses who knew them and all others, 
acccording to their understanding and best infor-
mation." 
"4. That Mrs. Grace Catharine Carson, in a 
hearing before the above entitled Court, testified 
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under oath that she and Mr. Charles Carson, also 
known as H. F. Swann, also known as Henry F. 
Swann, also known as R. C. Tiller, also known as 
Robert C. Tiller had traveled and lived together 
as man and wife in other states, including the 
State of Wyoming, in which they lived for a 
period of over six months, and in the State of 
Utah, for a period of twenty-five to thirty years." 
"7. That he left surviving the following 
heirs at law, Grace Catherine Carson, your peti-
tioner herein." 
Prior to filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decre:e, appointing Loren G. Norton as of July 
22, 1949, administrator, an Order of Publication of No-
tice to Creditors was filed on the 23rd day of June, 1949, 
by Loren G. Norton as administrator and publication 
of notice to creditors was completed on the 15th day of 
July, 1949. Publication to creditors being in the name of 
Charles Carson, also known as H. F. Swann, also known 
as Henry F. Swann, also known as Henry F. Tiller, also 
known as R. C. Tillier, also known as Robert Tiller, de-
ceased. 
I 
Tracy Collins Trust Company the·reupoo turned 
over the assets of the estate to Loren G. Norton for ad-
ministration and Tracy Collins Trust Comp·any was dis-
charged as special administrator on the 31st day of 
August 1949. 
That E. LeRoy Shields, a notary public had Dr. How-
ard T. Anderson file a claim for $25.00 on September 
8, 1949, and said claim was approved and allowed by 
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Court September 9, 1949. Pay1nent of said claim is al-
leged in the first and final account of Chas. Carson estate. 
That Loren G. Norton, as administrator filed a peti-
tion for widow's allowance for Grace Carson for the 
smn of $125.00 per ·month on June 29, 1949, and did. ob-
tain an Order granting widow's allowance on July 1, 
1949, \Yithout any notice of said hearing, and did again 
on October 28, 1949, file a petition for increase of widow's 
allowance to Grace Carson to the sum of $200.00 per 
month, which order was granted without notice on the 
28th day,of October, 1949. On December 7, 1949, Loren 
G. Norton filed a first and final account and petition 
for distribution in said estate alleging: 
Hthat the only heir of said decedent that can be 
found is Grace Catherine Carson who died on the 
4th day of N o;vember, 1949, leaving a will to her 
property and estate which has been filed for pro-
bate in the above entitled court." 
That on this first and final p·etition the only notice 
given was that of posting notices and the court did enter 
a decree of settlement of first and final account and for 
distribution and discharge as of the 21st day of Decem-
ber, 1949, which decree provided: 
"That the said. Charles Carson, also known 
as H. F. Swan, also known as Henry F. Swan, also 
known as R. C. Tiller, also known as Robert C. 
Tiller, deceased, died intestate leaving him sur-
viving the following heirs at law who would be 
entitle·d to share in the residue of said estate as 
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hereinafter described, remaining for distribution; 
Grace Catherine Carson, his wife, of ·Salt Lake 
City, Utah." 
That to date there has never been filed receipts in 
the estate of Charles Carson, deceased, nor a discharge 
of the adminis.trator as such. 
The plaintiffs allege eleven acts as the basis of this 
action, being broken ·up into three periods as follows: 
That the defendant, Loren G. Norton, did falsely, 
fraudulently and deceitfully enter into and act with 
Grace Catherine Carson in her application and actions 
applying for his appointment in said estate as the admini-
strator thereof in the following particulars : 
(a) That at the time Grace Catharine Car-
son filed her petition for letters of administration 
and objection to the petition of Dr. Howard T. 
Anderson, that defendant Loren G. Norton well 
knew that plaintiffs herein were the children of 
the decedent Charles Carson and to his best in-
formation resided in Chicago, Illinois. 
(h) That Grace Catharine Carson was not 
the widow of Charles Carson, deceased, nor was 
she his heir at law. 
(c) The. publishing of a purported notice to 
creditors, the first publication of which was on 
June 24, 1949, and the last date of publication 
. on the 15th day of July, 1949, prior to his appoint-
ment as the duly appointed and qualified admini-
strator of the estate of Charles Carson deceased. 
That Loren G. Norton, as administrator of the Es-
tate of Charles Carson, deceased, falsely, fraudulently 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
and deceitfully acted "~ith Grace Catherine Carson from 
the time of his appointment until the death of the said 
Grace Catharine Carson in the handling of said estate 
in the following particulars : 
(d) That no legal notice to heirs or creditors 
was ever published in this estate. 
(e) That he did file two petitions herein 
referred to in paragraph 11, for widow's allow-
ance and had the sum of $500.00 paid out of the 
estate, well knowing that Grace Catharine Carson 
was not the widow of the decedent or entitled to 
a widow's allowance. 
(f) That at no time after July 22, 1949, were 
~ notices sent to the plaintiffs herein advising them 
of any matter in the handling or distribution of 
the Estate of Charles Carson, deceased. 
(g) That no diligent search was made to lo-
cate the plaintiffs herein at Chicago, Illinois, and 
that plaintiffs have for many years resided at 
Chicago, illinois, and could easily have been lo-
cated through proper channels of investigation. 
(h) That he failed to inventory assets, 
which he owed to the estate, and thereby con-
verted the same to his own use in the sum of 
$300.00. That he failed to inventory an indebt-
edness of his brother, which was a loan on the 
part of the decedent to his brother, and that he 
failed to prope:rly inventory assets of said es.tate 
which were in his possession, namely numerous 
rings and settings of rings and instances of safety 
deposit box and blue foot locker. 
That Loren G. Norton, administrator, falsely, fraud-
ulently and deceitfully failed to disclose to the Corurt in 
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the First and F'inal Account and Petition for Distribu-
tion of said estate the fo1lowing: 
(i) The fact that he knew prior to the death 
of the decedent that the plaintiffs were the chil-
dren of the decedent and his lawful heirs. 
(j) That Grace Catharine Carson was not 
the widow of the decedent and entitled to distri-
bution of all assets of said estate as the only heir 
at law. 
(k) The fact of what search had been made 
as the administrator of the estate to locate the 
plaintiffs herein nor to disclose to the Court the 
likelihood of plaintiffs herein being heirs at law 
of said decedent well knowing, that he, the said 
defendant, would beneficially gain by not making 
any such disclosures of other heirs, as he at said 
time well knew, at the time of the filing of said 
First and Final· Account that Grace Catharine 
Carson had died on November 4, 1949, prior to the 
filing of the First Account and that he, the de-
fendant, was the residuary beneficiary of the es-
tate of Grace Catharine· Carson and would mate-
rially gain by not having the plaintiffs herein par-
ticipate in the distribution of the: estate of Charles 
Carson deceased, and that failure to dis·close to 
the Court the probability of such heirs for the 
purpose of depriving these plaintiffs of their just 
share of said estate and by such failure to so dis-
close the probability of plaintiffs, from having 
plaintiffs herein advised as to their interest in the 
estate, and to avoid any adversary contest in the 
p~robate of said estate·. 
At the trial of this cause it was determined that 
the plaintiffs were the children and heirs of Charles 
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Carson (R·. 1±6) so there is no issue of that fact on this 
appeal. 
\T olmne one of the transcript could have; be-en eli-
minated as the first four w·itnesses, namely plaintiffs 
and the two ~Ir. Bakers from South Dakota testified 
as to identity of plaintiffs. Counsel for The Employers 
Liability insisted on the full record on app·eal. 
The following statement of 'vitnesses will eliminate 
as much as possible of the fact that plaintiffs are heirs 
of Charles Carson, deceased. 
Robert V. Tiller, one of the plaintiffs, relates the 
names used during his life, states the name of his father 
and mother and that he was born October 4, 1901. (R. 173 
and 409). That he resided at 4707 Kenmore Avenue, 
Chicago, illinois, six years immediately prior to coming 
to Salt Lake City in 1950 (R. 174), and then relates the 
other various addresses where he resided in Chicago, 
since approximately 1930. (R. 182). His earliest re-
collection of any residence was Gynadotte, West Virginia, 
when about two years old. (R. 184). That his father's 
name was Robe·rt C. Tiller and mother's Maydie Sherman 
Tiller, and moved to Chicago and attended Longfellow 
Schoo~ until1912 or 1913. (R. 185). Then moved to Vetal, 
South Dakota residing there until 1926, and attended 
England School. (R. 187). That his mother died in Chi-
cago in 1926. (R. 189). He left the farm at Vetal, South 
Dakota in 1927, traveling to Omaha, Nebraska, Denver, 
Colorado, working on farms and for Union News Com-
pany at Denver. (R. 190). Returned to Chicago in 1930 
and resided there until 1950 except for trip~s. (R. 191). 
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Operated restaurant nine months 1n 1949 in Chicago. 
(R. 195). 
That his father's name while residing in Chicago 
was H. F. Swann and mother's name Mary Swann. Plain-
tiff's name, Robert Swann and sister's name Mildred 
Swann and the same names were used during the family 
residence at V etal, South Dakota. (R. 203). He last saw 
his father in 1923, when he left the farm at Vetal, South 
Dakota, but communicated by letter for a year. (R. 204). 
Made trip to California in 1948 by Trailway Bus. Made 
inquiry of father at Vetal in 1947 or 1948 by letter. (R. 
216). Had never received any mail from Salt Lake City, 
Utah, of any kind, and the name he used since 1930 was 
Robert Tillier. (R. 219). Had been working three or four 
years for Yellorw Cab in Chicago, prior to going to Cali-
fornia in 1946. (R. 269). 
On cross examination, plaintiff relates various em-
ployments (R. 345 to 375), and that he had a telephone 
listing in 1949 at Chicago. (R. 397 to 401). He used the 
name Tillier. (R. 401). 
The other plaintiff, Mildred Molinari, resides at 1354 
W ashtenaw, Chicago, Illinois. Recalled living in Hunting-
ton, West Virginia and that father's name was R. C. 
Tiller, and mother's name Maydie Tiller. (R. 427). That 
her brother, Robert Tiller, and the family moved to 3302 
Archer Street, Chicago. (R. 428). The family then mo:ved 
as a group to V etal, South Dakota and the father's name 
was then Henry F. Swann, mothe~r's name wa.s Maydie 
Swann, brother's name Robert s.wann and attended 
England School, graduating in 1913. (R .. 430). The 
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fan1ily resided as a group at \r etal, South Dakota until 
1922, "~hen mother and thh~ plaintiff went to Hunting-
ton, ''1'" est -y·irginia to see her grandin other for two 
months and then returned to Chicago. (R. 431). This 
plaintiff remained in Chicago, and Inother returned to 
\1'" etal, South Dakota, during which time this plaintiff 
was e1nployed about three weeks at Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
and 'vas then married and there was one child, issue of 
the marriage, Anthony l\folinari and that she. was later 
divorced and married Pellegreni and divorced hiin. (R. 
432). 
This plaintiff was present at divorce proceedings 
in Chicago by which her mother obtained a divorce from 
her father who was then residing in Chicago. (R. 433). 
Exhibits B-1 to E-1, admitted, showing personal service 
of summons on defendant R. C. Tiller at Chicago, Illinois, 
complaint filed, the testimony at the hearing of the di-
vorce decree and decree of divorce of Maydie Tiller from 
R. C. Tiller, July 7, 1924. (R. 434). This plaintiff was a 
registered voter in Chicago under the name of Pellegreni 
(R. 437). Phone in name of Mildred Molinari in Chicago 
for 10 years. (R. 438). In December 1926, at time of 
·death of her mother, this plaintiff saw her father at her 
home in Chicago and saw and talked with her fa.the:r in 
Chicago in 1927. She further identifie:d father in Exhi-
bits U and V. (R. 444). Relates various re'Sidences from 
earlie·st remembrance to date. (R. 445). 
This plaintiff was cross examined as to residences 
and marriages and divorces and various aliases used to 
date of trial, at various cities in this country. She related 
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that she had an unlisted phone at the Washtenaw ad-
dress in Chicago, always in the name of Molinari or 
Pellegreni. (R. 490). She is operating a cleaning busi-
ness at the present time in Chicago. (R. 492). She has 
been a registered voter since 1937 in Chicago under the 
name of Mildred.Pellegreni. (R. 499). 
George E. Baker a witness for the plaintiffs, who 
resides at Martin, South Dakota, and was the owner of 
ground in V etal, South Dakota, since 1913, and left there 
in September, 1929, (R. 279), stated that he knew a per-
son by the name of H. F. Swann who owned adjacent 
ground to him. That Swann came to Vetal, South Dakota 
in the fall of 1912 or in the spring of 1913. That Henry F. 
Swann, also known as H. F. Swann, visited him at his 
home almost every Sunday until such time as his family 
came to South Dakota. That the family of Henry F. 
Swann was Maydie, his wife, son Robert and daughter 
Mildred. He related that Swann tried at one time to ride 
a bull in ·a corral and he was thrown from the bull. (R. 
286). Identified (Ex. T.) as being Henry Swann and 
his wife and the women's name is Maydie, and the same 
people he knew as neighbors at Vetal, South Dakota. 
After Mr. Swann left the family homestead at Vetal, 
South Dakota, he next heard from him in January, 1944; 
identified letter, (Ex. Y) as having been received by him 
from the post office at Martin, (R. 288) ; identified letter 
(Ex. Z) as having been received by him in April of 1947. 
Had conversation at his home, Martin, South Dakota, 
about a couple of months after Exhibit Z was received 
with H. F. Swann, who told the witness that he had been 
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to Chicago trying to locate Robert and ~lildred. (R. 290). 
He stated he had no success and failed to find then1 and 
a~ked Ine if I kne"· any one he could rontact 'vho 1night 
perhaps kno"· anything or 'vhere he could find them. The 
main conversation had 'v-as about locating Mildred and 
Robert Swann. (R. 294). He stated he had be.en quite 
prosperous since he had been in S.alt Lake and said he 
had accwnulated quite a little wealth and he. had never 
done anything for the children and they were all he had 
and he wanted to find them if at all possible and do what 
he could for them now. 
He stated that when Charles Carson was at Vetal, 
South Dakota in 1947, he told him the purpose of his visit 
'\\~as to look for his children and after receiving the. card 
that he was unable to find them in Chicago, he never 
heard further from him. The last he ever heard was a 
letter from Salt Lake stating that he was dead. (R. 313). 
The letters which he received either in 1949 or 1950 were 
to the effect that Henry Swann had died and they were 
trying to locate heirs. (R·. 314). On cross exami-
nation Mr. Baker was shown Exhibit Y, one of the letters 
received from H. F. Swann with ink marks drawn 
through H. F. Swann and the words (to be forgotten) 
were on the letter when it was received by the witness, 
which indicated to the witness that H. F. Swann did not 
want his identity made known. (R. 323). This witness 
testified that Charles Carson told him that he was going 
by the name of Charles Carson. (R. 324). The witness 
relates that before 1944 he had heard that Swann was 
married under the name of Tiller and that this man had 
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come from Chicago and the two children on first ac-
quaintance were known as Robert and Mildred. (R. 329). 
George D. Baker, a witness for the plaintiffs testi-
fied that he resides at Martin, South Dakota. (R. 334). 
That he attended the England School, south of Vetal, 
South Dakota in 1913 and that during grade school at 
the England School, he knew Mildred Swann and Robert 
Swann and identified the plaintiffs as being those people. 
(R. 335). The· last he ever saw the p~laintiff, Mr. Swann 
was in 1927, (R. 337), but that plaintiff used the name 
of Tiller in 1924. (R. 338). That Robert S.wann gradu-
ated in 1916, and he had no co~mmunication with Robert 
Swann after he left Vetal in 1927. (R. 339). He never 
saw Mildred's father after 1922. (R. 340). 
L. J. Barclay, a witness in behalf of plaintiff testi-
fied that he is a practicing attorney and identified Ex-
hibits U and V as to Charles Carson and the women who 
purported to be his wife. (R. 506). The witness repre-
sented Charles Carson in excess of ten ye:ars prior to 
1948 and on several occasions in discussing the handling 
of real property and the interest of the lady that he was 
living with as his wife, such that she would have· to sign, 
Carson then told him that it was none of her business 
or something to that effect and then would go elsewhere, 
and each time that Carson came to the witness about real 
estate transactions he had explained to him that she 
had to sign and then he would go eJsewhere. (R. 507). 
During the last three or four years of the life of Mr. 
Carson, the witness had conversations with reference to 
two children of Mr. Carson. (R. 508). In the latter part 
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of 1947 he ca1ne to 'vitness' office talking about a son 
and daughter and a grandson by the name of Tony and 
that he had been back to Chicago and had gone over all 
the street known as DeKalb looking for his daughter and 
that his son's name was R. \r. Swann; that his daughter 
had married several times, and that he.r first name was 
~Iildred Swann and that he thought her name was Saba-
tora and the last name Moulanita; that the grandson 
Tony was studying in a medical schooJ. (R. 509). Ar-
rangements were made for witness to search for the chil-
dren and correspondence was had with a relative in 
West Virginia and the Chief of Police of West Hunting-
ton, West -virginia. (R. 510). 
On cross examination he testified that the search 
made by the witness for the children was in the latter 
part of 1947 and possibly into January of 1948. 
Edith Hazelrigg, called as a witness for p~laintiffs 
testified that she resides in Salt Lake City and that he.r 
name, prior to marriage was Edith Ge,rtrude Nicholls. 
(R. 520). That the mother of the witness was Mrs. Grace 
Catherine Sweney Carson and her father was Archie 
Nicholls. ( R. 521). Ex. L-1 being file #307 62 of the Dis-
trict Court in the probate of the Estate of Charles Car-
son, deceased, was admitted in evidence. (R. 524). The 
witness lived with her mother until about 1929 and said 
that she presumed her mother's name was Mrs. Nicholls. 
From 1930 until 1932 the witness lived with her mother 
at 227 South 2nd East Street, Salt Lake City, in a board-
ing house at which time she still presumed her mother's 
name was Nicholls. (R. 529). The witness knew of no 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
other name her mother was called by up to 1932 other 
than Sweney or NichoJls, and that since 1932 she had only 
seen her mother once. During 1929, while residing at 
the Woodruff Apartments with her mother, they had no 
roomers with them there but there was a gentleman that 
had eaten with them occassionally, but his name was not 
knorwn to the witness. ( R. 533). 
David Barclay testified that he is a member of the 
Utah Bar, (R. 538) and identified Mr. Charles Carson 
in Exhibit U, and that he represented Charles Carson 
while he operated a store on South West Temple Street. 
(R. 539). That Barclay & Barclay had been employed by 
Mr. Carson to make a search to locate his son and daugh-
ter. Mr. Carson informed the witness that he had been 
in Chicago in the fall of 194 7 trying to locate his son and 
daughter and was very certain they were in Chicago and 
was emphatic that the name Swann should be spelled 
with two ·n's. (R. 541). During a real estate transaction 
handled by the witness for Carson in approximately 1943, 
when it was explained to him that title would he in his 
name and that he and his wife would enter into the con-
tract and when the contract was paid up· he and she 
would have to give a Warranty Deed to the property, 
Mr. Carson at tha;t time stated "it is none of her business 
it is my money." Carson brought the people to the· office 
and the husband of the purchaser insisted that Mrs. 
Carson be on the contract as one of the sellers. Mr. 
Carson stated it was none of her business and at tha.t 
time I said to him, well is she your wife or isn't she and 
he colored up and refused to answer. (R. 544). 
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On cross examination the witness testified that at 
the request of :\Ir. Carson he had \VTitten to the Univer-
sity of Chieago to determine if Tony Molona.ri was a 
n1edical student, (R. 548) and likewise to Northwestern 
l .... niversity and received information of other medical 
schools in and about Chicago and Milwaukee; likewise 
the .... L\ssociation of ~Iedical Colleges were written to, 
\vhich covers all accredited schools, (R. 549) and inquired 
at Rush ~ledical College. ( R. 550). A letter was also 
written to the Chicago Public Library asking them to as-
sist in locating R. 'T· Swann and Mrs. Mildred Molona.ri, 
asking them to check the City Directory, but witness was 
not clear whether an answer was received or not. (R. 
551). 
Loren G. Norton, a defendant, called in behalf of 
plaintiff testified that he resides in Salt Lake City, is a 
real estate salesman for about a year and a half, and 
prior to that was in the dry cleaning business and is 
a married man and his wife's name is Gloria. (R. 553). 
The witness identified Charles CarBon in Exhibit U and 
first met Charles Carson and Mrs. Carson around May 
of 194 7 when he was purchasing Hollywood Cleaners. 
(R. 554). About four months after the witness purchased 
HoJlywood Cleaners from Neils Hansen, Mr. Carson in-
formed the witness that he held a mortgage on the busi· 
ness. (R. 556). In November of 1947, the~ amount of the 
Chattel Mortgage was greater than the payments agreed 
to be paid by the witness to Pete Hansen, the selleT of the 
Hollywood Cleaners and at that time a conditional sales 
contract between Charles Carson and the witness was 
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made. (R. 557). The. witness identified Exhibit M-1, the 
conditional sales contract between himself and Charles 
Carson. (R. 558). The witness then identified Ex. N-1 
which is a chattel mortgage and promissory note of the 
witness to Mr. Carson and testified that by March of 
1948 the conditional sales contract was paid down to 
$700.00, at which time he needed some. money and asked 
Mr. Carson for a loan of an additional $1300.00 and he 
gave it to the witness and he paid $700.00 to clear the note 
and a note was then issu~d for $2,000.00 to Mr. Carson. 
Ex. 0-1 was identified, showing the balance of the condi-
tional sales contract item at $700.00 paid in full and the 
$1300.00 check of Mr. Carson to the~ witness. (R. 560). 
Witness testified that he had no other checks other than 
Ex. P-1 which were paid to Mr. c·arson prior to his death. 
(R. 561). The witness testified that his relations with 
Charles Carson were chiefly business relations, but that 
Mr. Carson did not at any time during his lifetime seek 
advice from the witness in any business way. (R. 562). 
Witness then described the physical appearance of 
Charles Carson on or about October 1st, as being about 
75 years of age, and physically active. (R. 564). Be-
tween March 20th and the 1st part of July, 1948, the 
witness was in California and had no dealings with 
Mr. Carson other than through his brother with a power 
of attorney and had no visits with Mr. and Mrs. Carson. 
Between July 1, 1948, to Octobe-r 8, 1948, the, witness 
saw Mr. Carson about every day he was at Hollywood 
Cleaners. (R. 565). Witness testified that about ten days 
before October 8, 1948, Mr. Carson was taken to the 
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County Hospital and that he visited hin1 there and 
that he had a stroke and "·as capable of 1noving his arms 
or legs once in a \Yhile. The witness denied that during 
the ten day period while Charles Carson was at Jean's 
Rest Home, 2300 South State Street, where he died, that 
he at any time attempted to have Mr. Carson sign a 
general power of attorney. (R. 569). While Mr. Carson 
\Yas at J ea.n's Rest Home, he was refused once the right 
to see :\1r. Carson and after the refusal he made. a fur-
ther visit to ~Ir. Carson. (R. 570). On these: later occa-
sions the witness' attorney Mr. Jed Shields accompanied 
him. (R. 571). The witness denied removing any of the 
Charles Carson's personal property from Jean's Rest 
Hon1e and further stated that he moved Mrs. Carson out 
of her hotel and took everything out to Jean's Rest Home. 
(R. 572). Witness was notified of the de:ath ·of Charles · 
Carson p·robably five minutes after it happ·ened by the 
Rest Home. That information supplied to Neil O'Don-
nell, the undertaker for Charles Carson was given by 
Mrs. Carson to the witness and then communicated to 
Neil O'Donnell. (R. 573). On October 9th, the witness 
took Mrs. Carson from Jean's Rest Home and from then 
on made provisions for her residence. (R. 574). That 
~1rs. Carson was moved to two or three different places 
and then was hospitalized by Dr. Pace. 
Witness was asked the question: 
"Q. Did you ever have a conversation with 
Charles Carson in the latter part of 1947 as 
to whether or not he had been inquiring in 
the east for his children~ (R. 575). 
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Q. What did he say : relate when and where and 
what was said Mr. Norton. 
A. It was in the Hollywood Cleaners. All I re-
member about it is that he said he had been 
back looking for his children. 
Q. That is all that was said~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't you in your deposition, taken on No-
vember 4, 1950, page 32, beginning at line 13, 
weren't you asked the question by Mr. LeRoy 
Shields: At the time before his death did he 
ever state to you that he had any children 
at that time or whether he had any or not 
after he came back from the east. (R. 576). 
Your anwser was he didn't find anybody, did-
n't you so answer to that question~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he tell you he had been hunting for them, 
but he couldn't find them~ 
A. That is right." (R. 577). 
The witness was advised of request for his appoint-
ment as administrator of the Charles Carson Estate on 
October 13, 1948. (R. 580). The witness was asked the 
foll'OiWing questions and· gave the following answers: 
"Q. At any of the hearings in the Charles Carson 
Estate which took place in Judge Je:ppson's 
Court did you ever hear or were you advised 
by counsel that I, at that time was represent-
ing Dr. Anderson and re·presented that there 
were two children that were heirs to the· es-
tate~ 
A. Yes." (R. 581). 
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'Vitness further "Tas asked the following questions 
and made the follo"ring answers: 
"Q. Were you present in Court at the time· Judge 
Jeppson announced his decision that you were 
to be administrator of the Charles Carson 
Estate. 
A. I believe I was. 
Q. At that tin1e you represented you were like-
wise a debtor of the estate did you. not~ 
A. I did. 
Q. And stated you were a debtor in the sum of 
how much money~ 
A. $1100.00. 
Q. The $$1100.00 balance which you claim was 
due to Mr. Carson was the net balance which 
was due at that time on the note, that is June 
of 1949~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the interim between October 8, 1948, and 
the date of the announcement of Judge; J ep-
son had you made any payments on the ac-
count of the Chattel Mortgage to Charles 
Carson~ 
A. Yes, I gave Mrs. Carson two payments. 
Q. I hand you what had been marked Exhibit 
0-1, and ask you what they are:~ 
A. The two rece~ipts. 
Q. Of the amount which you represented to 
Judge Jeppson $1100.00 you had used the two 
receipts totaling $300.00 and you had deduc-
ted that amount to arrive at $1100.00 didn't 
you~ 
A. I believe so. (R. 582). 
Q. Do you at this time claim that the p~ayment 
by those two receipts to Mrs. Carson on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
Chattel·Mortgage of Charles Carson was paid 
to Charles Carson or his estate-~ 
A. Yes. I believe on one of those receipts it 
says-let me take a look, it says 'I received 
from Loren G. Norton, doing business as 
Hollywood Cleaners, $150.00 for October pay-
ment to Mr. Charles Carson, signed by Grace 
Carson," that was to him. 
Q. What was the date of that~ 
A. October 15, 1948. 
Q. What was the date of the other rece~ipt for 
$150.00~ 
A. November 15, 1948. 
Q. That was after the de-ath of Charles Carson~ 
A. Both of them was. (R. 583). 
Q. Mr. Norton, what if anything did you do with 
relation to discovering if there we-re any other 
heirs, other than Grace Carson, who pur-
ported to be a widow in the estate of Charles 
Carson~ (R. 585). 
A. As I stated before, I was at most of the hear-
ings and hHard what went on in court, and, as 
I understand it, Mr. Beless had looked for, 
and T·racy Collins Trust Company had looked 
for the~m without any success, and when Mr. 
Carson-before I was appointed administra-
tor I still tried to get in touch with friends 
of his and see if they knew anything of the 
children and they was the only people we 
kne~w at the time and they was some people 
Mrs. Carson told me about and I made a 
personal phone call to Toledo, Ohio and noti-
fied them he had died and asked if the1y knew 
anything of the children. 
Q. Is this phone· call the only endeavor you made 
outside of the State of Utah to find any other 
heirs~ 
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.A.. It is. 
Q. ''!as it before or after your appoint1nent as 
a.dn1inistrator that yon called T-Iarry Costello 
in Toledo, Ohio! 
A. Before, I believe, well I wasn't appointed un-
til June, 1949 \Yas I as administrator~ 
Q. Your oral order was June. 20th. 
A. It \Yas long time before that I got hold of 
Harry Costello. (R. 587). 
The Court. Do I understand during this per-
iod of your administration of the estate you did-
n't make any further inquiry! 
A. No Sir, the Judge-(R. 588). 
Q. Did you ever hear Mrs. Carson say whether 
or not she knew Mr. Carson had children~ 
A. No. I don't believe I did. (R. 589). 
Q. Did Mrs. Carson ever state to you after Mr. 
Carson's death on October 8th, whethe·r she 
knew l\fr. Carson had children by a previous 
marriage or not~ 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. You read in some of those petitions that there 
were no heirs known other than Mrs. Carson~ 
A. Yes. (R. 590). 
Q. When did you take posse,ssion of the p·ersonal 
effects of Mr. Carson~ 
A. When did I take possession~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. After Mr. Carson was in the rest home, I 
moved his wife and all his belongings, I be-
lieve everything went to J e·an's Rest Home. 
Q. Do you recall what with reference to the num-
ber of bags, trunks or things that was mo;ved 
particularly then~ (R. 594). 
A. As I remember it there was one trunk, a small 
suit case, some blanke~ts and some bags of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
clothing, I don't recall just what all of them 
was. 
Q. This trunk you recall, is that the blue foot 
locker that has been discussed~ 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Afte·r delivery of this blue foot locker to 
Jean's Rest Home, did you take it into your 
possession between then and shortly after 
the ·death of Mr. Carson~ 
A. Mrs. Carson did. Mrs. Carson asked me to 
take the blue: foot locker to my home'. (R. 59-6). 
Q. Demand was made upon yoru by Tracy CoJ-
lins Trust Company for delivery of all the 
personal property of Mr. Carson to the bank 
was it not~ 
A. No, there was demand for the foot locker 
I believe and Mr. Beless came to the house 
and picked it up. (R. 597). 
Q. You never discussed, prior to your appoint-
ment what was in the blue foot locker~ 
A. No. She said it was important papers in it 
and that was all. That is why she sent me to 
pick up the box and take it to my house~ 
Q. She told you the·re were important papers in 
"t' l . 
A. That is right. 
Q. Mr. Norton, I believe it is correct is it not that 
Grace Carson died on November 4, 1949~ 
A. That is right .. 
Q. When did you find out, first, that you were 
the residuary legatee of her e~state~ 
A. It was two or three days after she was in or 
shortly after she died. 
Q. By whom we:re you advised~ 
A. By Mr. Shields. (R .. 605). 
Q. Did you, at any time after your appointment 
discuss with your counsel the advisability of 
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for\\'"arding any notices of any type: to the 
plaintiffs advising then1 of the probate of the 
Estate of Charles Carson, deceased? 
A. I believe, there was notices sent out by the 
court "'"hile I was ad1ninistrator, that is all I 
kno".,.· 
Q. To these plaintiffs~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Have you seen such a notice~ 
A. I have not. (R. 609). 
Q. Mr. Norton, shortly afte·r Charles C·arson died 
you stated on cross-examination that you 
made a phone call to Harry Costello, is that 
correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. For what purpose Mr. N ort.on ~ 
A. Notifying him of the death and to see if he 
knew anything of the children. 
Q. What did Mr. Costello tell you concerning 
that~ 
A. That he didn't know anything about them. (R. 
613). 
On redirect examination Mr. Norton, you 
were asked the following question's and gave the 
following answers: 
Q. What endeavor did you make while you we:re 
administrator of the estate to locate them. 
The answer was 'and at the time of Mr. Car-
son's death I called a friend of his in Toledo, 
Ohio. Q. What was the~ name: of that p·erson ~ 
A. I don't remember. Costello I believe. I 
told him of the death and asked him if he 
knew of any children. 
Q. What was his reply to you. 
A. He didn't. 
Q. Was that H. C. Costello of 220 Maumee Ave-
nue, Toledo, Ohio 9 ~ 
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A. I believe so. 
Q. Did he inform you that he didn't knorw of any 
children~ 
A. He told me there was children. He didn't 
know anything of them. He said Mr. Carson 
hadn't heard from the.m for a good many 
years.' Did you so answer to those questions~ 
A. I did and I didn't deny just now that he said 
there· was children he said he didn't know 
anything of them." (R. 620). 
Exhibit T-1 which is the deposition of Gustave Kopp 
was received. ( R. 606). 
Neil O'Donnell, the undertaker called in behalf of 
plaintiffs testified as follows: 
"The Court. Mr. O'Donnell, there was one 
notation, he was married 24 years ago. 
A. Your honor, I cannot remember that definite-
ly,! don't know whether it came from Mr. 
Norton or Mrs. Carson, I am sure it was 
either party, but I am not sure which one. (R. 
637). 
Q. Who gave you that information~ 
A. Either Mrs. Carson or Mr. Norton and he was 
advised by his. widow, that could he a fact 
of Iny oiWil notations from Chicago. That was 
either Mr. Norton or Mrs. Carson and that 
he was married 24 years ago was either Mrs. 
Carson or Mr. Norton." (R. 638). 
Jean Sinclair, called as a witness for the plaintiffs 
testified that she resides at 2300 South State Street and 
operates Jean's Rest Home where Charles Carson was 
admitted September 27, 1948 and that Grace Catherine 
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Carson 'Yas a.d1nitted on October 2, lD-t-8 as a patient. 
The 'vitness identified l\[ r. Loren G. Norton in the court 
room as being the person '"ho made visits to 1\tir. Carson 
and the following testin1ony ""as adduced. 
~·Q. Do you recall any particular visitations to 
J.\fr. Carson by l\fr. Norton or attempts to 
visit Mr. Carson~ 
A. He crune down with another man for Mr. 
Carson to sign a power of attorney. 
Q. You say a power of attorney, did you see this 
purported power of attorney~ 
A. I saw the paper. 
Q. Did you read the same? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What conversation did you have with Mr. 
Norton or the man who accompranied him vvith 
reference to the same~ 
A. I told Mr. Norton, in my opinion the patient 
was not competent to sign a p·ower of attorne;y 
and without his doctor's permission that it 
couldn't be done in my home. (R. 647). 
Q. Was the:re any particular situation in 
which the personal effects of Mr. Carson were 
brought to your rest home1 Will you relate 
to the Court the circumstances in which they 
were received and what disposition was made 
of them1 
A. Mrs. Carson-Mrs. Grace Carson, was sent 
to the home through the ausp~ices of the Coun-
ty Hospital, the same as Mr. Carson and when 
she came she brought a foot locker and a 
couple of paper suit cases-paper bag suit 
case with her and a box of cooking utensils-
that would probably be a double boile:r or 
something like that and she brought them 
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with her and Mr. Norton was the man that 
brought them. 
Q. What was done with the p·ersonal belongings 
-what disposition did you make of them~ 
A. They were placed in a double garage in the 
rear. 
Q. Were they subsequently ever disposed of? 
Do you know what disposition was made of 
those particular i terns~ ( R. 648). 
A. Within 24 hours the foot locker disappeared. 
. It was locked-! didn't have. a key and didn't 
know the contents. 
Q. At or about this particular time of the bring-
ing of the foot locker to your rest home did 
you have conversation with Mrs. Carson with 
reference to the same~ 
A. Yes, Mrs. Carson wanted the foot locker with 
her and said there were important papers in 
it, such as contracts and different papers that 
Mr. Carson had. 
Q. You remember that within 24 hours the blue 
foot locker disappeared~ Did you report that 
fact to Mrs. Carson~ 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. Did you ever have any conve:rsation with Mrs. 
Carson while she was a patient at your home 
with relation to any trip, that she and Mr. 
Carson had made to Chicago~ 
A. Yes, she said first, prior to his stroke, that he 
ha;d been in Chicago to see! if he could locate 
two children. He had a boy and a girl, and 
that was only one of several he had made 
to locate the family. (R. 649). 
Q. Did you ever have any conversation with 
Mrs. Carson with relation to any indebted-
ness that was owed to Mr. Carson? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. \\.,.ill you kindly relate ".here the conversation 
took place and " .. ho was there and what was 
said please~ 
A. ~Irs. Carson had come down stairs to fix-
~frs. Carson came out in the kitchen and 
asked for a cup of eoffe·e. We gave it to her. 
She "'"as sitting there and she said the reason 
she didn't want Mr. Norton to have this box-
it 'vas very important that he didn't have this 
foot locker affair, was because that in it were 
papers showing he owed Mr. Carson $4,000.00 
and also other people, that owed money on 
accounts." (R. 650). 
~Irs. Ellen Ra,vlins, as witness for the plaintiffs, 
testified that she is part owner of Jean's Rest Home 
and that Charles Carson was a patient at the home. 
Relative to a power of attorney she testified: 
"Q. Will you kindly relate the conversation heard, 
relate what was said by one party and the 
other~ 
A. They asked to have the Power of Attorney 
signed. 
The Court: Who~ 
Q. When you say they that didn't indicate who 
made the statement. 
A. Mr. Shields, and Jean said she wouldn't allow 
it as long as the patient wasn't rational 
enough to know what he was doing. They 
wanted to take his hand and make a cross. 
They would have had to lift his hand because 
he couldn't use his hands." 
James W. Beless, Jr., testified that he was assistant 
trust officer of Tracy Collins Trust Company and that 
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he represented the special administrator and appeared 
numerous times in Judge Je·ppson's court on the ques-
tion of appointment of general administrator of the 
Estate of Charles Carson and related what letters and 
inquiries had been made to determine the whereabouts 
of the plaintiffs. He related that he inquired of a private 
investigator in Chicago as to his fee to carry on the in-
vestigation and it would be $30.00 to $40.00 per day, 
which matte~r was represented to the Court. The. Court 
had authorized the special administrator to expend 
up to $25.00 in making a search for p~laintiffs and stated 
that he had serious doubts whether a special administra-
tor had any power to make such a search without a Court 
order. Evidence of the true names of the· plaintiffs 
were obtained from papers within the blue foot locker 
and that subsequently the assets were turned OiVe!r to 
Loren G. Norton under order of court on July 22, 1949. 
On cross-examination he stated that the investiga-
tion to locate heirs was started around the first of 1949. 
(R. 678). 
Agnes C. Tee·ter called as a witness for the plaintiffs 
testified she resided at Salt Lake City, Utah and knew 
Charles Carson since about 1941. The following ques-
tions and answers were given : 
"Q. We will take· just the~ conversations you had 
at the place of business. Will you relate who 
was present and what was said on those occa-
sions! 
A. Just the· three of us. 
Q. With regard to conversations about children 
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(R. 686). Just tell "~hat Andy said, what 
Grace said and 'vhat you said if you can re-
call. 
A. He said he had a son and daughter and he 
hadn:tt heard fron1 the1n for years and they 
"~ere either in Chicago or in South Dakota,; 
that they had for1nerly lived in South Dakota 
and that he 'vas going to try and find them, 
and that "'"as his wish, because he knew his 
health "\vas bad and he had a slight stroke and 
he wanted to find these two children. (R. 
687). 
Q. And will you relate where the conversation 
took place and who was present and what was 
said. 
A.. I went up to see her. I come dorwn on the 
street car and then I gene·rally take a taxi 
home. I lived west on 6th North and Andy 
said 'I will go over to the bus depot with you 
to get your cab.' I had been down there 
several hours talking to them. 
We went over and sat in the bus dep·ot, 
this evening, and he said 'I am going to go 
back to Chicago to find my children.' He 
said 'would you let Grace live in your home 
and take care of her until I come back.' 
I S'aid 'well, as she is a sick women you 
shouldn't leave her.' He said 'I have to find 
my children.' He says 'I have arranged an 
insurance policy for her burial.' " (R. 688). 
She further testified her conversation with Grace 
was "she felt bad, she said she felt so bad. She called 
Andy 'Dad.' She felt so bad Andy had to die and die 
before he found his children, and that he had his heart 
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set on finding his children and that is what she felt bad 
about." 
William L. Sanders called for plaintiffs testified 
he knew Charles Carson for 14 or 15 years. That he had 
a business a couple of doors from Carson and were good 
friends and played cards several nights a week, as late 
as midnight, or as late as 3 :00 in the morning; that there 
were two or three different ladies coming to see him 
that he was going with, one by the name of Grace. and 
one by the name of Minnie, and that he had discussed 
with Carson about his children. 
The following questions and answers were given: 
"Q. During your relations with Charles Carson 
did you ever have any discussion as to 
whether or not he had any children~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you kindly relate where the conversa-
tions took place, who was present and what 
was said either by yourself and Mr. Carson 
or any other persons p-resent; just whatever 
you recall as being the conversation~ 
A. He often mentioned his two children; that 
he had and his wife; he hadn't see them in 
years. He didn't know where they were, but 
he often mentioned them to me wishing he 
could find them and shortly before he died, 
the last couple of years before he died he 
made two trips I know of back east with in-
tention of trying to get in touch with them." 
(R. 696). 
On cross-examination the witness stated that he 
had played cards with th.e decedent for fourte,en years 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
and 'vas in business side by side 'vith Charles Carson 
in 1936 and played cards both at the store on West Te!m-
ple and then later on South Ten1ple and that after Car-
son moved to South Temple he saw Grace Carson in back 
of the store. (R. 698). 
~Iinnie Steffen called as a witness for plaintiffs 
testified that she knew Charles Carson during his life-
time and identified Exhibits U and V as being exhibits 
given to her by Charles Carson. She first became ac-
quainted 'vith Charles Carson while she was working 
at a W.P.A. project and after her working hours termi-
nated at 3 :00 in the afternoon she went to his p·lace on 
West Temple and worked there for him. That during 
all of the time she worked for him he was on West Tem-
ple. That nearly every night she worked at the store, 
cleaning up and then would cook supper and on many 
oeeasions he would take her to a show. (R. 703). That it 
was three or four months after she first started to work 
for Charles Carson on West Temple before Grace Car-
son started coming to the store. (R. 704). That during 
these occasions, Charles Carson propo1sed to he-r several 
times and that she did not want to marry him. F'urther 
that at the store on West Temple he had discussed the 
fact that he had children. 
On cross examinination the witness testified that 
after Carson moved his business to west on South T'emple 
that she saw him ·at the store on nume·rous occasions and 
that Grace Carson was there at all times after he moved, 
but that she never had any meals with them, but an oc-
casional glas·s of beer. 
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Neils Hansen called as a witness for the plaintiffs 
testified that he had purchased p~roperty from Charles 
Carson an·d the decedent had visited him in his. home nu-
merous times and had related to the witness and his 
wife, at their place· of business on 2nd West that he had 
tried to locate his children and was going to make further 
trips to Chicago to locate them, stating that he had some 
children, a son and a daughter. This witness related that 
Grace Carson knew of the children by the following 
conversations: 
"Q. During your acquaintance with Grace have 
you ever had any conversation with Grace in 
relation to Andy Carson's. family~ 
A. Well, we used to mention it a lort of times-
she called Mr. Carson "Dad"-He was very 
anxious to locate his children because, he was 
getting along in years and he wanted to make 
some arrangements to see if they were taken 
care, of, because he felt that sometime or other 
he hadn't done just right by them, was the 
way I gathered it, and he was very anxious 
to locate them and see that they were taken 
care of with what he· had." (R. 716). 
Dougla:s Thomsen, called on behalf of plaintiffs 
testified that he had made a complete search of the Third 
District Court records from 1890 to the time of testifying 
and that there appeared no divorce action between an 
Archie Nicholls and Grace Catherine Sweney Nicholls, 
or the re:Verse. thereof. 
Martha Larson called as witness for the plaintiffs 
testified to the attachment of proof of mailing notices on 
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October 16, 194S in Exhibit L-1 and proof of notice in 
Exhibit 19 on the 16th day of April 1949 in the petition 
filed by Neil O'Donnell and then testified to the custon1 
as to return or non-return of letters which were sent 
to purported heirs in other states; that there is no record 
kept of letters returned and that they are merely thrown 
in the ·w·aste basket and whether or not envelopes mailed 
in the three instances on the petitions of Dr. Anderson 
and Neil O'D-onnell 'vere ever returned or not she had 
no recollection. 
E. LeRoy Shields testified that he was the attorney 
for the Charles Carson estate; that he never had any 
conversations with Grace Carson with reference as to 
whether or not Charles Carson had any children; tha.t 
the only thing he knew about the plaintiffs was the pro-
ceedings in court ·and the petitions brought in and argu-
ments made thereon with reference to the appointment 
of an administrator. That the witness drew the various 
objections and petitions incident to the probate of the 
Charles Carson Estate, and that the allegations which 
were made were the answers which Mrs. Carson had 
given to him; that he made no inquiry of any Arizona 
heirs but that was on the part of Mrs. Carson. 
Subsequently Mr. Shields testified as follows: 
"Q. I am interested only in the question of two 
children as heirs. 
A. She never told me at that time. I don't know 
that she ever told me anything about any chil-
dren. I was acquainted with that fact when 
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you filed the petitions in court that there was 
a claim of that. 
Q. But you neiVer discussed it with her as final-
A. Only asked her about it, if she knew anything 
about them. 
Q. What did you ask her~ 
A. I asked her if she knew anything about any 
children of Charles Carson. (R. 736). 
Q. What did she say~ 
A. She said no. 
Q. Where was that conversation had~ 
A. I couldn't tell you that, whether it was in 
my office or somewhere else. After the mat-
ter of the children came up I talked to her 
and asked her what she knew about them if 
anything. She said she knew nothing." (R. 
739). 
The deposition of Grace Carson was introduced as 
Exhibit Y-1. This deposition was taken on the 26th day 
of November, 1948 at L. D. s .. Hospital. The following 
questions and answers were adduced. (Page 3, Ex. Y-1). 
"Q. Were you ever married to anyone·· prior to 
assuming the name of Carson~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was your name at that time~ 
A. It was Carson. 
Q. Where did you first mee~t Mr. Carson' 
A. Right here in Salt Lake City. 
Q. What year~ 
A. I don't know, it has been so long. 
Page 4. 
Q. What is your best judgment Mrs. Carson, 20 
years ago~ 
A. It would be I guess, 30 years ago. 
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Q. Were you ever married to Charles Carson 
'vho was also known as H. F. Swann, also 
known as Henry F·. Swann' 
.... \. Yes, I was married to him but I never knew 
anything about Swann. 
Q. When and where were you married to this 
Charles Carson' 
A. It was in Dakota, but I can't think of the 
nrune. 
Q. What year~ 
A. It must be 25 or 30 years ago anyway. 
Q. You have some recollection of the city, do 
you know-Dakota and in what Dakota' 
A. South Dakota, but it was a little bit of junky 
town, terrible. 
Page 5. 
Q. What time of the year was. it~ 
A. It was the 23rd of I think February. 
Q. And you think 20 to 25 years ago~ 
A. Yes. It was all of that. 
Q. Would it be more than 25 ~ 
A. I think it would be. 
Q. Would it be as many as 30 years~ 
A. It would be closer to 30. 
Q. 30 years in Dakota~ 
A. Yes. 
Page 6. 
Q. Do you claim you are a common-law wife of 
Mr. Carson or a le·gal wife~ 
A. I claim I am a legal wife. 
Q. To best of your recollection is it between 
25 or 30 years ago~ . 
Page 7. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In S'Outh Dakota' 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had no children by Mr. Cars.on' 
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A. No. 
Q. You had no children by any other man~ 
A. Yes, I had a child with Mr. ____________ , the first 
husband but she is dead. 
Q. Were you ever divorced from your first hus-
band? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When and where!? 
A. I don't know, I don't know really and truly. 
Q. Did you ever have divorce papers? 
A. Yes I did have a divorce. He always had 
them. 
Q. Who had them? 
A. My husband. 
Q. Which husband? 
A. The first one. 
Q. Did you obtain a divorce or he? 
A. I got a divorce or asked for a divorce. 
Q. Did you go to someone in Salt Lake City for 
the divorce? 
A. Yes, it was-I can't think of the name. 
Page 10. 
Q. How long before your marriage to Mr. Car-
son did you divorce your first husband? 
A. My lands it was about ten years. 
Page 12. 
Q. You have only had two husbands you claim, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. You were divorced from him before you mar-
ried Mr. Carson? 
A. Yes. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED 
UPON 
POINT I. 
THAT THE JUDGEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE OF MRS. GRACE CARSON BEING A WIDOW AND 
HEIR OF CHARLES CARSON. 
POINT II. 
THAT AN ADMINISTRATOR IS A TRUSTEE IN THE 
BROADEST SENSE AND HELD TO THE SAME HIGH DE-
GREE OF STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY AS A TRUSTEE. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE DUTY OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
IS LIMITED. 
POINT IV. 
FAILURE TO PERFORM THE DUTY TO MAKE DIS-
CLOSURES WHICH RESTS UPON ONE BECAUSE OF 
TRUST AS FRAUD FOR WHICH EQUITY IS AN INDE-
PENDENT ACTION WILL RELIEVE AGAINST JUDGMENT. 
POINT V. 
ORDER OR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF DE-
CEDENT'S ESTATE AS PROTECTION OF ADMINISTRA-
TOR AGAINST CLAIM OF ONE NOT NAMED THEREIN 
WHO IS ENTITLED TO A SHARE OF AN ESTATE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE JUDGEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
DENCE OF MRS. GRACE CARSON BEING A WIDOW AND 
HEIR OF CHARLES CARSON. 
We cite the case of In Re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 
72, 197 Pac. (2d) 143, and quote from the opinion of Jus-
tice. Pratt at page 147: 
"We hold that where, as here, the first wife 
attacks the validity of a marriage by her husband 
to a second wife, then the burden of proof rests 
with the. first wife, after proving her marriage, 
to rebut the presumption of divorce arising from 
the proof of the second marriage. In vie~w of the 
many years that elapsed during which contestant 
and deceased lived apart and with others in family 
relationship, this case is particularly strong evi-
dence of the merit of the rule." 
We contend that the following evidence clearly dis-
closes that Grace Catharine Sweney Carson could not 
have been legally married to Charles Carson for the fol-
lowing reasons : 
Exhrbit (W) is a certificate of marriage of R. C. 
Tiller of Cincinnati, Ohio to Maydie Sherman of Cincin-
nati, Ohio dated the 13th day of September, 1899 at Cov-
ington, Kentucky. Exhibit (X), the 13th Census Report 
of the United States, 1910, shows Henry F. Swann head 
of the family, Maydie Swann, his wife:, Robert Swann, 
son and Mildred S-wann, daughter, residing at 3302 
Archer Street, Chicago, Illinois. Exhibit (B-1) is a certi-
fied copy of personal service of summons on R. C. Tiller 
on the 23rd day of May, 1924, at Chicago, Illinois. Exhibit 
(C-1), is a certified copy of divorce complaint; Exhibit 
(D-1), certified copy of transcript of evidence; Exhibit 
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(E-1), certified copy of Decree of Divorce of Maydie 
Tiller fro1n R. C. Tiller on the 7th day of July, 1924 at 
Cook County, Illinois. 
These exhibits disclose that R. C. Tiller was married 
to Maydie Sherman fron11899 until July 7, 1924. Mildred 
Molinari, one of the plaintiffs, saw her father on -several 
occasions at the death of her mother in Chicago in De-
cember of 1926 and she likewise talked with her father on 
the street in Chicago in 1927. 
Exhibit Y, being a letter of the decedent to George 
E. Baker at Martin, South D·akota, identifies himself 
as being H. F. Swann, of Vetal, South Dakota. This exhi-
bit states: 
"I wonder where my boy is-'Robby' you re-
-member him-I have not heard from him in years, 
but how I wish I knew where he is now for after 
what has taken place in Chicago I have not heard 
or seen him since. Mildred is married and my 
wife died and I wandered out to Cruifornia and 
finally landed here about 15 years ago, went into 
business and have been here very since." 
This exhibit is dated January 16, 1944, so that 1'5 
years prior would be January 1929 by the decedent's own 
statement as to when he arrive-d in S-alt Lake. 
As to Exhibit (Z) being a letter from the decedent 
dated Ap·ril 6, 1947, to Mr. George E. Baker at Martin, 
South Dakota, he recites within the letter: 
"All in all, since I left S. D. most 18 or 20 
years has been spent in Utah and I ha:ve no re-
grets for having come here." 
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Further on in the letter the deeedent states : 
"I have some property and money, about 20 
grand. This of course belongs to the children if I 
can find them." 
This exhibit likewise indicates from the decedent's 
own statements that he had left S.outh Dakota about 20 
years before which would be 1927. 
Edith Hazelrigg, who is the daughte·r of Grace 
Catharine Sweney Carson, admits living with her mother 
in Salt Lake City until1932 and that her mother was then 
known by the name of Nicholls-or Sweney. 
William L. Sanders identifies that his place of busi-
ness was next to the decedent in 1936 on West South 
Temple and that at that time, two women by the name 
of Minnie and Grace were seen at the place of business 
of the decedent. 
Minnie Steffen who cleaned up the place of business 
of the decedent on West Temple Street, which 
would have to be in the year 1936 or prior thereto, testi-
fied that she had been working for the decedent almost 
every day after she completed her W.P.A. sewing work, 
cleaned up the store, numerous times cooking his meals 
and that the decedent took her out to shoiWs and on nu-
merous occasions proposed marriage to her which she 
refused. 
There will be no question that Charles Carson de-
ceased, lived with Grace Catharine· Sweney Carson as 
man and wife from approximately 1936, until the da.te 
of his death, but that does not prove marriage· by which 
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Grace Carson could be a "·ido'v and heir. Exhibit (Y-1) 
is the deposition of Grace Carson, taken November 2'6, 
1948, at the L. D. S. Hospital, which date is subsequent 
to the death of the decedent. 
The 'vitness was asked questions and gave the fol-
lowing answers: 
HQ. ,,~hen did you first meet Mr. Carson~ (Page 
3 Ex. Y-1) 
~\. Right here in Salt Lake City. 
Q. And what year? 
A. I don't know. It has been so long. 
Q. vVhat is your best judgment Mrs. Carson~ 
Tw .. enty years ago~ 
Page 4. 
A. It would be, I guess thirty years ago. 
Q. Thirty years ago~ Were you ever married to 
Charles Carson, who was also known as H. 
F. Swann, also known as Henry F. Swann~ 
A. Yes, I was married to him, but I never knew 
anything about Swann. 
Q. When and where were you married to this 
Charles Carson~ 
A. It 'vas in Dakota but I can't think of the 
name. 
Q. What year~ 
A. It must be 25 or 30 years ago anyway. 
Q. Was it after the time you met Mr. Carson in 
Salt Lake City, Utah~ 
A. 1res. , 
Q. And how did you happen to go to the Dako~tas 
to be married~ 
A. I didn't go there to be married. I went to see 
a woman, and, of course, I told him I was go-
ing, and he said he was going in a w:eek or so. 
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Q. What time of the year wa.s it? 
Page 5. 
A. It was the 23rd of, I think February. 
Q. And yoo think 20 to 2·5 years ago~ 
A. Yes, it was all of that. 
Q. Would it be as many as 30 years~ 
A. It would be, close~r to 30. 
Q. 30 years-in Dakota.~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you claim you are a common-law wife of 
Mr. Carson or alegal wife·~ 
A. I claim I am a legal wife. 
Q. To the best of your recollection it was be-
tween 25 or 30 years ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. In South Dakota.~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had no children by any other man~ 
A. Yes, I had a child with Mr. ____________ , the first 
husband, but she is dead. 
Q. You have only had two husbands you claim, 
is that correct~ 
A. That is right. ( 
Q. You were divorced from him before you mar-
ried Mr. Carson T 
A. Yes." 
We must assume that the evidence of Grace Carson 
is p-roof of he:r purported marriage, thus at the bare 
minimum 25 years from N ovembe~r 1928, would be No--
vember, 1923, at which time Mr. Carson was still a mar-
ried man, being married to Maydie Tille!r, who divorced 
him the following year at Chicago, Illinois on July 7, 
1924. By reason of the claim of Grace, Carson that it was 
a legal marriage and not a common law marriage~, the 
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question of her Inarria.ge n1nst be det.ertuined by a legal 
marriage to Charles Carson. 
Grace Carson as late as 193:Z 'va.~ residing with her 
daughter, Edith Hazelrigg, and as late· as 1936 at the 
West Temple Store of the decedent, Minnie Steffen was 
proposed to by the decedent and Minnie Steffen was like-
'vise working for approximately four months prior to 
the first appearance at the decedent's place of business of 
· Grace, '\vho is identified as being Grace Carson, who 
lived with the decedent after he removed his store from 
West Temple to South Temple Street, and lived with 
him as husband and wife until October 8, 1948, the date 
of his death. 
Charles Carson while discussing a real estate trans-
action with David Barclay in 1943 was asked by Mr. 
Barclay, if she, referring to Grace Carson was not his 
wife, he colored up and refused to answer. On other oc-
casions concerning real estate transactions with both 
David Barclay and L. J. Barclay, he stated that it was 
his money and that it was none of Grace Carson's busi-
ness and ~pon those instances went elsewhere for his 
work to be done. 
POINT II. 
THAT AN ADMINISTRATOR IS A TRUSTEE IN THE 
BROADEST SENSE AND HELD TO THE SAME HIGH DE-
GREE' OF STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY AS A TRUSTEE. 
It is the fundamental principle that an executor or 
administrator occupies a duty of high trust and is held 
to a strict accountability under that trust. 
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We quote from the case of Rice v. Rice, ------ Utah 
______ , 212 Pac. (2d) 685, from the opinion of District Judge 
Van Cott at page 689: 
"Initially we desire to make it plain that an 
executor or administrator occupies a position of 
the highest trust and confidence not only to the 
creditors and beneficiaries of an estate, but to the 
court as well, and so he is required to act in entire 
good faith. * • • 
"Accordingly an executor is a trustee in the 
broadest sense and is held to the same high and 
strict accountability of a trustee." 
Clearly, there can be no argument that Loren G. 
Norton as administrator of the estate of Charles Carson, 
deceased, would be held to a high and strict accounta-
bility as a trustee for heirs of this estate. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE DUTY OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
IS LIMITED. 
"Sec. 102-4-15, U.C.A. 1943. Id. POWERS 
AND DUTIES. 
"The special administrator must collect and 
preserve for the executor or administrator all the 
goods, chattels, debts and effects of the decedent, 
and all income's, rents, issues, p.rofits, claims and 
demands of the estate; must take the charge and 
management of, enter upon and preserve from 
damage, waste and injury, the real estate, and for 
such and all necessary p·urposes may commence 
and maintain or defend actions and other legal 
proceedings as an administrator, and exercise 
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such other po,Yers as are conferred upon him by 
his appoint1nent; but in no case is he liable to an 
action by a.ny creditor on a cla.iln against the 
decedent." 
That the appointn1ent of Tracy Collins Trust Com-
pany as special administrator of the Charles Carson 
Estate '"'as lhnited as follows: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the 
powers of the special administrator shall be limit-
ed to collection of goods, chattels, debts and estate 
of the decedent and all incomes, rents, insurance, 
profits and claims and demands of the estate and 
to take charge and manage and for such and all 
necessary purposes may commence and maintain 
or defend actions or other legal p-roceedings as 
an administrator, but in no case is said special 
administrator liable to any action by any creditor 
or a claim of decedent." (Ex. L-1) 
In Re Pingree's Estate, 82 Utah 437, 25 Pac. (2nd) 
937, Justice Elias Hansen at page 939 said : 
"The duty of Mrs. Pingre·e 31S special admini-
stratrix was to preserve the property until a 
general administrator was ap·p·ointed. Upon such 
appointment, it became her duty in the absence 
of an order of court to the contrary to render an 
account and deliver the p·rope:rty of the estate 
which had come into her poS~session to the: gene-
ral administrator." 
The duty of the special administrator was thus 
limited and the only Order of Court for expenses in lo--
cating heirs was the sum of $25.00 which was so nominal 
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that no extensive search in anywise could have been had. 
Furth~r, that it was proper and not the duty of a special 
administrator to make search for heirs as that comes 
under the duties of a general administrator when so 
qualified. 
POINT IV. 
F AlLURE TO PERFORM THE DUTY TO MAKE DIS-
CLOSURES WHICH RESTS UPON ONE BECAUSE OF 
TRUST AS FRAUD FOR WHICH EQUITY IS AN INDE-
PENDENT ACTION WILL RELIEVE AGAINST JUDGMENT. 
It is a fundamental principal that "an administra-
tor or executor is under a duty to exercise the utmost 
good faith in all his transactions regarding the estate. 
While administrators and executors acting in good faith 
are treated with indulgence, and not held answerable 
on slight grounds, they will not be allowed to promote 
their own personal interest to the injury of the heirs 
at law, and any fraud upon the part of an executor or ad-
ministrator, which tends to defeat the ends of the trust 
reposed in him, will justify the court in de.claring his acts 
void, whenever this can be done without prejudice to the 
rights of innocent third persons." 21 Am. J ur, 515. 
We do not cite authorities for these principles at 
this point. The p·rinciple'S will be found reiterated time 
and time again in the authorities hereinafter cited. 
In the case of Aldrich v. Barton, et al (Cal.) 71 Pac. 
169, in this action after there had been a distribution of 
the estate to a trustee under the terms of the will the 
' trustee filed an account charging off certain iten1s as 
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sales of capital investment instead of being income to 
'\\~hich the 'Yidow 'vas entitled to a quarter share. The 
account 'vas filed ":hile the 'vidow was in the H.awaiian 
Isl'ands and ha.d no notice of the account or its contents 
or the hearing thereof, except such notice as the court 
ordered, viz: posting for ten days, and more than six 
months had expired and likewise the time for appeal. 
The court said at page 170 : 
"The trustees took advantage of the absence 
of the cestui que trust to present a false and 
fraudulent petition to the court, and have it acted 
upon without her knowledge. This was fraud upon 
the court, as well as upon the absent inte:rested 
party, and this is held to be a fraud "extrinsic to 
the case," which prevented the plaintiff from be·-
ing properly represented at the hearing, or from 
being represented at all. Sohler v. Sohle:r, 135 
Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282. In the Sohler Case the 
fraudulent decree was the result of a conspiracy 
between the trustee. and another, but the p~rinciple 
of that case applies with equal force here, for 
a fraud is equally abhorrent to equity, and is to be 
measured by the same rules, whether it be· the re-
sult of conspiracy or arises from the corrupt mo-
tives of the trustee alone. The demurrer should 
h~ve been overruled. We advise that the judgment 
be reversed." 
In the case of Riae v. Rice, ·-····- Utah ______ , 212 Pac. 
(2) 685, the facts in this case we feel nee·d not be dis-
cus·sed, because they are undoubtedly clear in the courts 
mind. 
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District Judge Van Cott at p~age 689 said: 
"It is clea~ from the letters that appellant 
was guilty of extrinsic fraud, and that the trial 
court was justified in so finding. But quite apart 
from the extrinsic fraud, the trial court was justi-
fied in vacating the order and decree on the 
ground that the executor had not made to the 
court a full and fair disclosure of the rights of re-
spondent. * * • 
"Here the executor in his capacity of resi-
duary legatee was unjustly enriched by the con-
struction placed by the court upon the will upon 
his ex parte showing, to the impoverishment of the . 
legatee entitled to her legacy. It was a fraud of 
the most serious nature. It involved not only a 
breach of fiduciary duty to the respondent but a 
breach of duty to the court." * * * 
"From the above citations it is quite apparent 
that this Court has the power and authority to 
deal with cases of the class pre!sented; that an 
executor is a trustee owing an obligation to his 
legatees and devisees and to the Court; and that a 
petition to the Probate Court which misconstrues 
the amount of a legacy or the construction of a 
will is extrinsic fraud, and a fortiori where the 
guilty executor stands to profit by his wrongful 
act." 
Further, at page 690, the Court said: 
"Also having in mind that appellant by the 
terms of the will was to have the land he was oc-
cupying, can it be said that a.ny executrix desiring 
to carry out the terms of a will under such condi-
tion would not at least petition the Probate Court 
for an interpretation of the will~ But respondent 
did not do this. She proceeded to select the land 
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on the "~est side of the high\\,.ay and give that to 
appellant and she denied to him by the caprice 
of her o•\vn judg1nent the barn property on the 
east. This all was done by what she in effect con-
cluded 'vas the infallibility of her own mind and 
judgment to say nothing of the gain in land and 
'vater she ",.as to profit by as one of the residuary 
legatees. That she was fallible is shown by the 
evidence and the finding in part of the Trial Court 
in this matter. We believe that in view of the 
above facts, together with the duty she owed to 
appellant, she has not acted in good faith, and as 
her interpretation of the will is not correct in that 
it understates the amount he is entitled to, she has 
been guilty of extrinsic fraud sufficient to justify 
the intervention of a Court of Equity." 
In the case of Hewett et al v. LinsteadJ et al (Cal.) 
122 Pac. 352. 
In this case one George Golden vvas pTedeceased 
by his 'vife and the plaintiffs in this action are the heirs 
at la-\v of ~Irs. Golden. That a portion of the· estate of 
George Golden consisted of property which, during the 
lifetime of his wife, was community property; that none 
of the plaintiffs had any actual knowledge of the de·ath 
of George Golden until after the final de.cree of distri-
bution in his estate which was distributed to his. heirs. 
Plaintiff first learned of the facts afteT the final decree 
of distribution had been entered but while~ an ap·p·ea.l 
was pending by a third p·erson. 
Presiding Justice Pe~ters said at p.age 355 : 
"Although there is some confusion in the 
cases, we agree with plaintiffs that the better rule 
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is that where a legatee knows of the existence of 
other heirs, and, for the p·urpose of defrauding 
such heirs, and benefiting himself, fails to notify 
the court of the existence of such heirs, and know-
ingly files false petitions with the court represent-
ing there are no such heirs, he is guilty of ex-
trinsic fraud warranting the imposition of a trust 
on the fraudulent distributee's interest. In Mul-
cahey v. Dow, supra, it was impliedly held, and 
in Monk v. Morgan, supra, it was expressly held, 
that even in such a case the fraud is intrinsic and 
is not extrinsic. The better-re,asoned cases, how-
ever, are in accord with the rule as aboiVe stated. 
See Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, at page 476, 
et seq. where the cases are collected and discussed, 
2'3 P. 2d 758, 88 A.L.R. 1194; United States v. 
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93; see also, 
cases collected in annotations in 113 A.L.R. 1235; 
88 A.L.R. 1201. * * * 
"These cases establish that, where the exe-
cutor or heir knowingly suppresses evidence of the 
existence of other heirs with intent to defraud 
them, the fraud is extrinsic warranting the equity 
court in granting relief, but where the; executor 
or heir acts in good faith the: decree is final and 
conclusive and equity is without power to impose 
a trust." 
In the case. of Larrabee v. Tracy, et al, (Cal.) 134 
Pa.c. (2d) 26'5. 
In this action Mrs. Larrabee, was the child of Kate 
Chase who was a legatee under the will of Mark H. Rice. 
The executor who was also the residuary legate,e advised 
Mrs. Larrabee of the will and that the one,-sixth inte~r­
est in the estate would revert to her. On the third account 
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the executor asked for a construction of the will alleg-
ing Kate Chase predecease.d the testator and that the 
will disinherited all persons other than those specifically 
narned therein including the decedent of Kate Chase and 
that this devise "'"ould lapse and become part of the resi-
due. Notice of hearing was by posting only. This peti-
tion was granted and decreed that Mrs. Larrabee was 
not entitled to any of the estate. l\Irs. Larrabee learned 
from her almt later that the aunt's devise had been paid 
and so commenced this action. 
The Court said at page 268: 
"The evidence shows that ap·pellant led re-
spondent to believe that she was entitled to the 
share of the estate her mother would have re-
ceived had she survived the testator, and that dis-
tribution would be made accordingly as soon as a 
fair price could be obtained for the real property 
in the estate. In correspondence covering a period 
of over five years appellant never at any time in-
dicated that there was any question concerning 
respondent's right to be substituted in -her 
mother's place. Appellant seeks to justify this 
conduct by claiming that he 'erroneously belie~ved' 
that the bequest and devise to Kate Chase 're-
verted' to respondent upon the de!ath of Kate 
Chase and that it was not until about the time 
the petition for distribution was filed that he 
'was advised and determined' that he. was in 
error. This, of course, does not excuse appellant's 
failure to notify Mrs. Larrabee that he had 
changed his position and intended to ask the 
court to distribute to himself the legacy Mrs. 
Larrabe·e had been led to belie·ve she would re-
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ceive. Without informing Mrs. Larrabee of his 
intentions, appellant presented his adverse claim 
to the probate court stating as a fact that her 
share had lapsed. Appellant prosecuted his peti-
tion knowing full well that respondent would not 
be in court to challenge his claim to her share of 
the estate. Wellman's conduct effectively pre-
vented Mrs. Larrabee from obtaining a fair ad-
versary hearing and, in our opinion, affords ample 
justification for the granting of equitable re!lief. 
As executor of the estate and its residuary legatee 
appellant had a clear duty to refrain from taking 
an unfair advantage of the impression he had cre-
ated. An executor has numerous fiduciary obliga-
tions to the beneficiaries of the estate. In 1 Scott 
on Trust (1939) it is stated (#6, P. 48) 'An execu-
tor is often called a trustee·; and in the broad 
sense of the term so he is. * * * The relation be-
tween an executor or administrator and the lega-
tees and distributees, like that between a trustee 
and the beneficiaries of the trust, is a fiduciary 
relation.'" 
The Court further said at page 269: 
_ _.. 
"While it may be tha.t appellant would not 
have been guilty of a breach of duty had he given 
res.ponde·nt actual notice. that he intended to dis-
pute her right to the· legacy, allorwing sufficient 
time for her to obtain an attorney to re:pre.sent 
he.r in the probate hearing, it would be unconscion-
able for a court of equity to hold that, under the 
circumstances of this case, he had fulfilled his 
obligations by compliance. with the statutory re-
quirements of (posting notice at the courthouse." 
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In the case of Purinton r. Dyson (Cal.) 65 Pa.c. 2d 
777. 
This is an action involving- a pretermitted heir. The 
decedent Adeline Potter died testate leaving- as her only 
heirs Thomas Purinton a son, and respondent who is a 
daughter of a deceased son. By he:r Will Mrs. Potte!r 
bequeathed $100.00 to her son and $50.00 to Dyson an.d 
the residue. of the estate to a Schaffer who was also 
executor. Schaffer presented the will for probate, by a 
petition stating that the only heir at law was decease:d's 
son. Schaffer was ap·pointed and qualified and on p·eti-
tion for distribution under oath stated that the p:ers:ons 
entitled to distribution were tho1se named in the will. 
Distribution of the estate was had and the following 
year Schaffer died leaving the bulk of his estate to Dy-
son. The Court in Bank at page 779 said: 
"However, it is difficult to see how fraud 
could be practiced more directly upon one entitle:d 
to present his rights to a court than by keeping 
him in ignorance of the p·roceedings. It is true 
that in most cases of extrinsic fraud the defend-
ant has said something directly to the p·e!rson 
whose rights were involved amounting to re~pre:.. 
sentations that it was not necessary for such 
person to take any part in the proceedings. In 
other cases, acts have been held to amount to 
such re.p~resentations. But the rule allowing the 
maintenance of an action in equity for extrinsic 
fraud should not be limited so strictly as to 
require as a basis evidence of rep~resentations 
made dire·ctly to the one defrauded. 
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"In this case notice of the hearings of Schaf-
fer's petitions was required to be served upon 
the heirs of the testator either pe·rsonally or by 
mail. Section 328, Probate Code!. Schaffer as 
the proponent of the will in the first instance and 
as the duly qualified and appointed exe.cutor 
thereof after it was admitted to probate was 
charged with the utmost good faith to the heirs 
of the deceased and to the court. It was his duty 
to see that notice of the proceedings was given 
to those whom he knew to be heirs of Mrs. Potter. 
The same situation was considered in the case 
of Zare:mba v. Woods (Cal. app·.) 61 P. (2d) 976, 
980. There the executor of a will also presented 
a petition stating that the deceased left no heirs. 
It was claimed, as it is here, that his representa-
tion amounted to intrinsic but not extrinsic fraud. 
But the court held that the allegation constituted 
extrinsic fraud, saying: "There is a clear line of 
demarcation, however, between a statement made 
in the petition for the probate of the will which 
would limit the giving of notices to heirs, and 
te·stimony in court to the effect that there were 
no such heirs, after the heirs had been notified 
of the proceeding for the p·robate of the will, as 
provided by the different sections of the Probate 
Code." · 
"Whatever may have been the motive of 
Schaffer, whether it was induced by the agree-
ment which the court found he made· with Mrs. 
Potter's son, or by some orther reason, his acts 
in suppressing all information concerning re'"" 
spondent and representing Thomas Purinton to 
be the only son of the deceased, runounts to fraud 
practiced directly against the respondent. They 
furnish abundant foundation for a judgment hold-
ing him to have been a trustee· for the. prope,rty 
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"~hich should haYe been distributed to the re-
spondent but 'vhich he 'Yrongfully received.'' 
In the case of Caulk v. Lowe (Okla.), 178 Pac. 101. 
In this case Judge K. Clingan died inte,state and 
one Fannie ~f. Caulk filed a petition that she was the 
only heir of the decedent and had her husband appointed 
administrator and later filed an account and final settle-
ment which account was approved and thH administrator 
discharged. On the day following the discharge· Fannie 
M. c·aulk filed a petition for designation of heirship and 
on the same day the Court entered Findings that Fannie 
!f. Caulk was the sole and only heir at law of the. de-
ceased. Three years late.r Mary c·. Lowe, claiming to 
be the legitimate daughter o.f the decedent filed her p·e:ti-
tion to have vacate.d the final order discharging the 
administrator and the order dete·rmining heirship. The 
Court entered judgment on behalf of Mary Lowe. and 
an appeal is taken therefrom. 
The Court said at page 106 : 
"The· weight of evidencH discl~osed that fraud . 
was practiced by the defendant by withholding 
from the county court information had by Fannie 
M. Caulk and Otto Caulk at the time· the appli-
cation was made for the appointment of Otto 
Caulk as administrator, and at all the subsequent 
proceedings in the case, that Mary C. Lowe was 
the daughter of the decedent and an heir of his 
estate which resulted in having the said Fannie 
M. C~ulk wrongfully adjudged the sole heir of 
Judge K. Clingan, deceased. That the orde-rs and 
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judgment involved in the instant case which were 
sought to be· set aside is a probate matter does 
not admit of question, and therefore. the district 
court had jurisdiction of the appeal from the 
county court sitting in probate. 
"It therefore clearly appears that the county 
court and district court had jurisdiction, and 
that the contention of proposition one is without 
merit. 
"The great weight of the evidence shows that 
Judge K. Clingan and Angeline Sisk were legally 
n1arried in accord with the laws of Tennessee, 
and the said Mary C. Lowe was the result of such 
nnion; therefore there can be no question that the 
said Mary C. Lowe is an heir of the estate of 
Judge K. Clingan, deceased, and the undisputed 
record of the county court, together with the evi-
dence in the case, conclusively showing that the 
fraud alleged to have been perpetrated by Fannie 
M. Caulk and Otto Caulk upon the county court 
sitting in probate was perpetrated, and that no 
notice whatever was given Mary C. Lnwe of any 
of the proceedings had in the court which resulted 
in declaring Fannie M. Caulk the sole heir of the 
said e~state, the county court never acquired juris-
diction of Mary C. Lowe, and that, therefore the 
orders and judgment as to her were void; which 
findings of the court of facts, and the judgment 
rendered, are not eontrary to the weight of the 
evidence in the case, and therefore the second 
p·roposition is without weight. 
"The court in its. findings found that Mary 
C. Lowe, the petitioner, was the legitimate child 
of Judge K. Clingan; and, having s·o found, it 
was entirely immaterial whether or not Mary C. 
Lowe was ever recognized by the decedent as a 
member of his family, as a le·gitimate. child is 
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an heir regardless of \Yhether or not it 'vas ever 
recognized as a n1en1ber of its father's family, or 
"'"hether or not the father ever lived with the 
family in 'vhich such child reside,d, and it was 
unnecessary for tl1e court to find 'vhether or not 
:Jiary C. Lo,ve \Yas ever received in the fan1ily of 
the decedent. 
~'The court fotmd that in withholding the 
information that she should have given the pro-
bate court in her petition for administration arid 
the other proceedings in the case in the said 
probate court that Fannie M. Caulk practiced a 
fraud upon the court. It is entirely unimportant 
in this ease as to whether or not her husband, Otto 
Caulk, participated in this fraud, and the:refore it 
was not neeessary for the court to make any 
findings as to the action of Otto c·aulk. 
"The court found that Judge K. Clingan and 
the mother of Mary C. Lowe, Angeline Sisk, were 
legally married. 
"The court found that this action was not 
barred by limitation. 
"Hence the court found upon every question 
of fact upon which the defendant requested find-
ings of facts. It is true that the court did not find 
the facts as defendant desired, but this is not an 
error." 
In the case of J or gens en v. Jorgensen (Cal.), 193 
Pac. 2d, page 728. 
This is a case of where husband and wife had 
entered into a separation agreement and the: wife sub-
sequently obtained a divorce based upon the statement 
of assets agreed upon by the parties. The wife then 
brought this action to set aside the deeree of divorce 
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based upon misrepresentation of the separate and com-
munity property as disclosed by the statements on which 
the divorce was obtained. 
The Court said at page 732 : 
"The latter policy applied when a party's 
adversary, in violation of a duty arising from a 
trust or confidential relation, has concealed from 
him facts essential to the protection of his rights, 
even though such facts concerned issued invoJved 
in the case in which the judgment was entered. 
"The failure to perform the duty to speak or make 
disclosures which rests upon one· because of a 
trust or confidential relation is obviously a fraud, 
for which equity may relieve from a judgffient 
thereby obtained, even though the breach of duty 
occurs during a judicial proceeding and involves 
false testimony, and this is true, whethe~r such 
fraud be~ regarded as extrinsic or as an exception 
to the extrinsic fraud rule." 3 Freeman Judg-
ments, 5th Ed., p. 2576; see: Laun v. Kipp, 155 
Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183, 5 A.L.R. 655." 
In the case of Crow v. Mads en, et al. (Cal.), 111 
Pac. (2d), page 7. 
In this case Martin C. Madsen was a son or.f Hanne 
Madsen and was made executor of he·r last will which 
gave to Helen Crow $3100.00. Madsen upon becoming 
exeeutor reported to the court that there was no prope~ty 
in his hands and claimed ceTtain real estate· of his mother 
by re·ason of assignment and deed leaving nothing to 
probate in her estate. The plaintiff brought this. action 
claiming fraud on the part orf the executor and was grant-
ed a judgment. 
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The Court said on page 15 : 
H''rhen he a.eeepted the position of executor 
of the Hanne. ~la.dsen estate he beca1ne not only 
an officer and agent of the court but a trustee for 
the beneficiaries under the '"'ill of Hanne Madsen 
of '"'hich plaintiff '"'as one. He then owed the duty 
to the court and to plaintiff to disclose. every 
n1aterial fact 'Yithin his knowledge bearing on 
the property of the estate or of any interest there-
in. He failed to perforn1 his duty, which, undeT 
the decisions we have cited was extrinsic fraud. 
If the allegations of the amended complaint are 
true, "~hich we must assume at this stage' of the 
proceedings, he went furtheT than the passive act 
of concealment and took the positive position of 
representing to the court that Hanne Madsen 
had no ·property nor estate at the time of heT 
death. Whether or not this representation was 
intrinsic or· extrinsic fraud, it is not necessary to 
decide, as the extrinsic fraud of breach of duty 
by conceahnen t is sufficient. 
"We have, therefore, reached the conclusion 
that the fraud alleged in the ame:nded complaint 
is extrinsic and sufficient to sustain the action." 
In the case of Anderson v. Lyons, 32 N.W. 2d 849. 
In this case one Claes Willander died testate in 
ldaho and bequeathed $1000.00 to his brother Ander J. 
A.nderson who predeceased him and the residue of the 
estate to his nieces and nephews. The. plaintiff was 
Ander's adopted son and was a resident of Minnesota. 
The will was probated in the state of Idaho in which 
the plaintiff did not share in the estate and p·laintiff 
alleged that it was defendant's duty to bring to the 
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Court's attention that plaintiff was entitled to Ander's 
le~gacy and to a share as a nephew but that the defendant 
knowingly and intentionally failed to name the plaintiff 
in the petition for probate of the will and to bring to 
the Court's attention that plaintiff was entitled to share 
in the distribution of the estate and that these facts 
were concealed from the Court and by such concealment 
plaintiff was intentionally defrauded of his share of 
approximately $5000.00. 
The. Court at page 851 said: 
"Knowingly and intentionally concealing from 
and failing to disclose to the probate court in 
probate proceedings the existence of a person 
interested in the estate so that such person is by 
decree deprived of his in teT·est in the e·state con-
stitutes extrinsic fraud against which such person 
is entitled to equitable relief. Annotation, 113 
A.L.R. 1235. The Annotation collects numerous 
cases involving the· question. 
"In Schmitz v. Martin, 149 Minn. 386, 183 
N.W. 978, we applied the rule, but without stating 
whether the fraud there was extrinsic or intrinsic. 
There, a daughter of decedent with knowledge of 
the faet that plaintiff was decedent's son's. widow 
stated in the petition for the probate of his will, 
devising his. farm to decedent's widow for life 
with remainder over to his son and daughte~r, 
that decedent's son left no issue and that dooe\,. 
dent's widow and daughter were (149 Minn. at 
page 388, 183 N.W. at page 979) "all of the heirs 
and dervisees" of decedent, and made no mention 
of plaintiff, thereby knowingly and intentionally 
concealing from the probate court plaintiff's exist-
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ence a~ decedent's son's \Yido\Y and heir and the 
final decree of distribution follo\\yed the: petition 
reciting the allegations as to decedent's only 
heirs being his \\Tido'v and daughter. There the 
son's \Yido,Y, \Yho "Tas defrauded as an he:ir, was 
a nonresident of this state, where the probate 
proceedings \Yere had, the san1e as plain tiff here 
was a non-resident of Idaho, where the p·robate 
proceedings here \Yere had. We held that the evi-
dence established fraud entitling plaintiff to equi-
table relief setting aside the probate de:ere.e and 
establishing her right to the share of deeedent's 
estate wrongfully diverted from her by a probate 
decree; that, \vhile a probate de.cree is final and 
conclusive as to all matters thereby adjudicated 
(149 Minn. at page 387, N.W. at p-age 979) "it 
may be assailed and set aside in a direct proceed-
ing for that purpose, on the ground of fraud"; 
and that an action for equitable relief, s.uch as 
there, to establish and enforce rights constitutes 
a direct attack upon the final decree,." 
In the case of Hewitt v. Hewitt, 17 Fed. Rep. 2d, 
710. 
In this case the appellant was adopted by Hewitt 
in 1872 in Kansas and about two ye:ars after the, adop-
tion the appellant was taken from his custody by Court 
order because of cruel and inhuman treatme,nt. After 
the separation the appellant did not communicate with 
Hewitt 'and p·urposely avoided giving his any notice·. of 
his whereabouts for fear that he would disinherit him 
by will. In 1921 the ap·pellant had attorneys employed for 
him in Los Angeles to check and see if Hewitt was still 
living in that city. The residence listed for Hewitt was 
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phoned and a statement was made that he was down 
town. These facts were then communicated to Hewitt 
through his counsel. On January 9, 1922, Hewitt died 
at Los Angeles leaving his only heirs his widow, a 
daughter by a previous marriage and the appeUant. 
Seven months after the death of Hewitt the. Los Angeles 
attorneys again were requested to check to detennine if 
Hewitt was still living and upon phoning the Hewitt 
home was informed that he was out of town for a few 
W&3ks. The widow of the deceased at the time of the 
latter phone call was in the east and during her absence 
the property was being cared for by a friend. Appellant 
first learned of the death of Hewitt in June of 1925 but 
in the meantime Letters Testamentary had be:en taken 
out, the administration of. the estate had been closed, 
and the estate distributed to the widow ·and daughter 
as sole heirs at l'aw. In the petition for letters of admin-
istration filed by the widow and in the: petition for dis-
tribution of the estate no reference was made to the. 
fact that appellant was an heir or that he ever e~xisted. 
During Hewitt's lifetime he executed three wills, 
each of which devised the sum of $10.00 to his adopted 
~on. The widow had seen these wills after he~r marri'age 
and was familiar with their contents. She questioned 
Hewitt in refere:nce to the adopted son and was informed 
by him that he had such a son but that he had been given 
back to his parents and he had heard that the son was 
dead. The knowledge thus gained by the Widow was not 
communicated to .the attorney in the settlement o£ .the 
estate nor to the court in which- the estate· wa.s admin-
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istered. Hewitfs daughter had no notice that the appel-
lant had ever been adopted by her father or that such 
a person existed. 
The Court at page 718 said : 
~~Here, by reason of the trust and confidential 
relation existing between the· p·artie.s, a positive 
duty rested on the administratrix to fully advise 
the court as to all facts and all information in 
her possession concerning the heirs of the de.ce-
dent and their whereabouts. This duty she: wholly 
failed to discharge, and the reas.on for her failure 
cannot be accepted. She knew that her husband 
had an adopte·d son, and the only knowledge or 
information she had as to his de·ath was the bare 
statement of her husband that he had been so 
reported to him, but where, when, or by whom 
she was not advised. Furthermore, she· knew that 
her husband had made provision for the adopted 
son by will as late as June 1920, thus indicating 
that he himself did not give full credence to the 
report of his death. She made no inquiry for 
the adopted son, at his last known place of address 
or elsewhere, and maintained silence solely be.-
cause of the hearsay statement made to her by 
her husband some years before. Had she com-
municated all of these facts to the: court, it is not 
at all likely that a decree of distribution would 
have be·en entered without directing further in-
vestigation or inquiry-at least we have a right 
to so presume. Nor will we: speculate as to what 
might have happ·ened, had S'he p·ursued the proper 
course. 
"But it is said that, if her mere silence con-
stituted fraud, it was intrinsic fraud, against 
which a court of equity is powerless to grant 
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relief, and United States v. Throckmorton, 98 
U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed 93, is cite·d. * * * 
"On the other hand, the doctrine is equally 
well settled that the court will not set aside a 
judgment becauie it was founded on a fraudulent 
instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any mat-
ter which was actually presented and considered 
in the judgment assailed." 
But in the same connection it was further 
said: 
"But there is an admitted exception to this 
general rule in cases where, by reason of some·-
thing done by the successful party to a suit, the.re 
was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the 
issue in the case. Whe·re· the. unsuccessful party 
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his 
case, by fraud or deception p-racticed on him by 
his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, 
a false. promise of a compromise; or where the 
defendant ne·ver had knowledge of the suit, being 
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plain tiff ; or 
where an ·attorney fraudulently or without au-
thority assumes to represent a party and con-
nives at his defeat; or where the attorney reg-
ularly employed corruptly sells out his client's 
interest to the othe·r side.- these, and similar 
cases, which show that there has ne·ver been a 
real contest in the trial or he!aring of the case, 
are reasons for which a ne1w suit may he sustained 
to set aside and annul the former judgment or 
decree, and op·en the case for a new and a fair 
hearing." 
"This case·, we think, falls within the exce~p­
tion, and not within the general rule. Here the 
appellant was prevented from presenting a claim 
for his portion of the estate: by the fraudulent 
conduct of the administratrix, and there has been 
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no adYersary trial or decision of any issue as 
between the parties to the present suit. The ap·-
pellees frankly concede that, if the appellant had 
been prevented fron1 making claim to the estate 
because of some fraudulen:t statement or misrep-
resentation on the part o£ the administratrix, a 
court of equity would readily grant relief, but it 
is contended that mere silence on her part pre-
sents an entirely different question. But there 
can be no sound distinction between the giving of 
false information and the failure~ to give correct 
information, where the giving of the latte.r is a 
matter of legal duty. 
In the case of Weyant et al. v. Utah Savings & Trust 
Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 Pac. 189. 
In this case Harvey Weyant abandoned his wife 
and children in Springfield, Mass., in 1890 and elop·ed 
with a Rosella ~!cintyre to parts unknown but he died 
in Salt Lake City, Utah in July, 1910 unde·r the. name of 
Harvey W. Fuller where he had. been in business and 
lived with Rosella Fuller as man and wife. Rosella 
Fuller probated his estate as his lawful wife and only 
surviving heir when she knew that decedent had a wife 
and children as lawful heirs and that she had no right 
OF claim to any prope·rty. She thereafter conducted all 
proceedings and had distributed to her the full estate 
but it was found that she failed to inventory certain 
property which she ap·pr~~priated to her own use. 
T·he Court at page 199 said: 
"In this case, however, the administratrix, 
so far as respondents are concerned, acted direct-
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ly contrary to and in the very teeth of the duty 
imposed upon her by law and by the bond that 
is sued on. It was the duty of the administratrix, 
under the law, to publish proper notice, so as to 
apprise the heirs, and all others interested in the 
estate, of its true condition; and when she failed 
to do that, but published notice in a false and 
fictitious name, known to her to be so, she utterly 
failed to "faithfully execute the duties of the trust 
according to law," a.s provided in the. bond. Nor 
did she, as the bond provided, administer the 
estate "for the use of the heirs" of the deceased, 
as she was bound to do. Nor did the wrongs com-
mi tte.d by her occur after the decree of distribu-
tion, nor when acting in a capacity orther than 
that of administratrix. It is sometimes somewhat 
difficult to determine whether the wrongful acts 
complained of occurred at a time when the admin-
istrator is acting as s.uch, or whe,ther the:y occur-
red after he had ceased to so act and acted in a 
different capacity. Sometimes the administrator 
may act in a dual capacity, one. as administrator 
and the other as trustee, etc. There may thus be 
circumstances,. as is well stated in some' of the 
cases, where an administrator may have defraud-
ed an heir while acting as trustee, and after he 
had ceased to act as administrator. 
"In the probate proceeding here in question, 
however, the administratrix not only failed to 
p·ublish proper notice., so far as respondents are 
concerned, but she utterly failed to make and 
return a true and complete inventory of the prop-
erty belonging to the estate. Again she: converted 
to he:r own use about $12,000 worth of prope~rty 
of the estate without making an inventory there-
of, and without disclosing its existence~. That act 
alone constituted an insufferable fraud and mani-
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festly constituted a breach of the bond. 18 Cyc. 
p. l~G7. ~loreover, all of her acts \Vhich resul'ted 
in despoiling respondents of their inheritance 
occurred during the adn1inistration of the estate, 
and not after the decree of distribution ha;d been 
entered, and 'vhen the administratrix wa.s acting 
in a private capac-ity, or in a capacity of trustee 
1nerely. T·rue, she was awarded possession and 
control of the property which was inventoried, 
and 'vhich 'vas left for distribution, by the decree 
of distribution; but that decree was directly 
based upon extrinsic fraud practiced by her, 
w·hich fraud likewise constituted a breach of the 
bond in question here. 
In the case of Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 
Pac. 522. 
Justice Frick at page 527 said: 
"While the court may assume that, as a 
matter of law, and for the purpose of jurisd~­
tion, both the known and the unknown heirs are 
before the court, yet, whether the heirs are living 
in different states or otherwise:, it cannot be p·re-
sumed that a prudent and careful judge would 
ordinarily proceed to distribute without notice to 
the heirs or to some accredited person re!present-
ing them. · 
"There are various provisions in the statute 
by which full power and discretion is vested in 
the probate court with respect to the time· and 
manner of giving n.otice during the course of 
administration, and the court may thus, in every 
case, suit the n~tice to the circumstances and 
conditions confronting it. But the mere fact that 
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such notices may be provided for does not neces-
sarily make them jurisdictional." 
In the case of Child et al. v. District Court of Second 
Judicial Dist. et al., 80 Utah 243, 14 Pac. (2d) 1110. 
District Judge Worthen said at page 1111: 
"His right to notice of all proceedings is 
important; sales of property, mortgages, and 
family allowance, all affect his rights, and if he 
is in fact an heir, he should be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard in respect thereto. Until his 
heirship is established, his right to petition for 
distribution does not exist, and he may be re-
quired to stand by until the recognized heirs 
may desire distribution, in order to establish his 
claim. The p~roof available to establish his heir-
ship when he files his petition may be unavailable 
when the time for distribution arrives." 
The holding in the abo~e cases has been retiterated 
in the appellate courts of many other jurisdictions. S.ee 
for example: 
In re Ross' Estate (Cal.), 73 Pac. 976; 
Jones v. Arnold, 221 S.W. (2d) 187; 
Ferguson v. Wachs, et al., 96 Fed. (2d) 910; 
In re. Bailey's Estate, 238 N.W. 8415; 
Appeal of O'Neal, 11 Atl. 856; 
State v. Vincent, et al. (Ore.), 52 Pac. (2d) 
203· 
' Sears v. Rule (Cal.), 114 Pac. (2d) 57. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants contend that Mrs. Grace 
Carson knew of the fact of their existence by reason of 
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discussions eoncerning the deeedenfs children \rith the 
witnesses Jean Sinclair, nlinnie Steffen and Agnes C. 
Teeter, the latter \Yith "rhon1 Grace (~arson discussed the 
children of the decedent as late as the evening of the 
Rosary held for the decedent, and yet filed petition for 
Letters of .... L\.dministration stating that there were no 
known heirs other than herself. She further discussed 
the fact that there "~ere no children with the defendant 
E. LeRoy Shields a.s the attorney for the Estate of Char-
les Carson in \Yhich Objections, Cross-Petitions and 
Amended Petitions were filed in her behalf. Likewise 
Grace Carson knew at all times herein mentioned that 
she had never been legally married to the decedent be-
tween the years 1919 and 1923 which would be 25 to 30 
years before the date of taking her deposition and is 
her statement for the date of a legal marriage in South 
Dakota. 
The defendant Loren G. Norton discusse.d with the 
decedent within the last few months of his life the fact 
that ·the decedent had two children whom he had be.en 
searching for in Chicago and could not find. On the 
death of the decedent Norton calle;d H. C. Castello at 
To~edo, Ohio who told him there: were. children but that 
he didn't know anything of them and that Mr. Carson 
hadn't heard from them for a good many years. Further, 
Norton inquire:d in and about the neighborhood of the 
decedent's residence: and was advised by various pe:ti-
tions at the hearings of which he: was present in Court 
and heard discussed that there were: two children tha.t 
were heirs living in Chicago when last heard of in 1944, 
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and various receipts were introduced (Exhibit T-1), 
showing that the decedent was paying on a land assess-
ment de~al at Chicago, Illino[s as late as 1947 in his own 
name as Henry F. Swann, in the name of his son Robert 
V. Swann, in the name of his daughter Mildred Swann 
and in the name of Mrs. H. F. Swann, his deceased wife. 
And further that the notices of these assessments were 
sent to Henry F. Swann, 176¥2 West South Temple 
Street, New Villa Hotel, Salt Lake City, Utah, care of 
Carson and Carson. Even though defendant Norton 
knew these facts he never disclosed to the Court at any 
time the fact that he had knowledge that there were two 
purported heirs. 
Defendant Norton had published notice to creditors 
in the Estate of Charles Carson by July 15, 1949 and, 
yet he was not formally appointed Administrator of said 
Estate until July 22, 1949 by reason of Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree of Judge Joseph G. Jeppson. Can 
it thus be said that there was Notice to Credito~s pub-
lished by a duly appointed, qualified and acting Admin-
istrator. 
The defendant Loren G. Norton never at any time 
during the administration of the: Charles Carson Estate 
had any notice forwarded to the plaintiffs of any kind. 
Further the two orde:rs obtained for widow's allowance 
were without any notice at all, and the hearing for 
Petition for Distribution was had only by p.osting of 
notices. 
The defendant Loren G. Norton further well knew at 
the time of filing the Petition for Distribution in the 
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Charles Carson Estate that he and his wife Gloria Nor-
ton 'vere the residuary beneficiaries unde,r the Will of 
Grace Carson and that they would materially bene·fit by 
not 1nentioning to the Court on final distribution that 
the plaintiffs were heirs of the decedent Charles c·arson 
and that their particular inheritance unde~r the, Will of 
Grace Carson "~ould be many times more if the plaintiffs 
did not inherit and even assuming that Grace Carson 
was a widow and entitled to one-third of the Estate of 
Charles Carson, Deceased. Further it is peculiar that 
two independent witnesses would testify to the fact that 
Loren G. Norton did attemp·t to have a Power of Attor-
ney signed by the decedent Charles c·arson a few days 
before his death and while in a physical condition after 
strokes that his hand would have to be held to even mark 
an "X" on the Power of Attorney. Is it not likewise 
peculiar that the Blue Foot L.ocke,r containing all the 
evidence of the value of the Estate of Charle.s c·arson 
should have been removed by this defendant from the 
premises of J e:an's Rest Home and that even Mrs. Grace 
Carson stated that she did not desire to have the defe.nd-
ant Norton have possession of the box as it contained all 
the contracts and papers evidencing indebtedness of 
other parties including this defendant in the sum of 
$4000.00. Likewise defendant Norton required a formal 
demand on the part of the Sp~e:eial Administrator to 
.relinquish the evidence of the assets of the Estate (Ex-
hibit R-1). Defendant Norton likewise made arrange-
ments for all residences of Grace Carson afte·r the~ death 
of Charles Carson and to the date of her death Novem-
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ber 4, 1949. This defendant paid to Grace Carson two 
$150.00 payments between October 8, 1948 and June 20, 
1949 which sum of $300.00 was not payment to the Estate 
of Charles Carson and was not evidenced in the Inven-
tory of the Charles Carson Estate. Furthermore there 
have never been any receipts filed in thei Charles Carson 
Estate nor has the Administrator or his Bondsmen been 
discharged and yet the assets of the Charles Carson 
Estate were. turned over to the defendant E. LeRoy 
Shields, as Executor of the Estate of Grace Carson, 
Deceased. 
We contend that the foregoing facts show a fraud-
ulent method between the defendant Loren G. Norton 
and Mrs. Grace Carson to the date of her death by which 
the District Court on distribution of the Estate of 
Charles Carson would never be advised by the Admin-
istrator of his knowledge of two heirs who were entitled 
to inherit. 
POINT V. 
ORDER OR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF DE-
CEDENT'S ESTATE AS PROTECTION OF ADMINISTRA-
TOR AGAINST CLAIM OF ONE NOT NAMED THEREIN 
WHO IS ENTITLED TO A SHARE OF AN ESTATE. 
The defendants and respondents in this action take 
the position that there was a determination of heirship 
on the question of the apporintment of the administrator 
and by the· deere:e of distribution which is. final and theTe-
fore res judicata. 
The position of plaintiff and app~eJlant is that the 
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hearing. on petition for letters of ndntinist.ration eould 
not be a determination of heirship as there '"as no person 
representing plaintiffs or in priYity 'v-ith then1 and tl1at 
the ·order of Judge Jeppson appointing amninistrator 
n1e.rely designates the preference of ~Irs. Carson for 
filing. 
In the case of In Re Ste~·ens Estate, 102 U. 255, 130 
Pac. ( 2d) 85, the Court said on page 85 : 
h~-\.s 'vas pointed out in the. case of In re List-
Inan's Estate, 57 lTtah 471, 197 P. 596, 600: "It 
Ina.:~ "~ell be conceded that when an executor (or 
administrator) in the discharge of his trust ha.s 
exercised that degree of care which a pirudent 
person ordinarily exercises in the conduct and 
management of his own affairs, the law, in case 
of loss, will hold him immune from personal 
liability. He is not an insure-r, and if he exercises 
ordinary care and diligence in the. performance 
of his duties he may not be held for mistake or 
error in judgment." 
In the case of Welch v. Flory et al. (Mass.), 200 
N.E. 900. 
In this case it involves a decree of distribution of 
Agnes vV elch who died intestate in 1929, the. respondent, 
the husband of a niece of the intestate was appointed 
administrator and in his petition stated that decedent 
left no husband and as her only heirs at law W Hlch the 
petitione.r herein, described as her brother, and other 
persons described as nephews and nieces and the resi-
dence of petitioner was stated to be Boston, Mass. On 
the petition for final distribution persons entitled there-
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to were named only as nieces and nephews and made no 
1nention of the petitioner and distribution of the estate 
was had upon that petition. At the. time of his appoint-
ment as administrator his wife: informed him that 
James Welch, the petitioner was about 72 years of age 
and living at 115 Holton Street in the Brighton District 
where he had lived for 15 years. During the time he 
voted and paid taxes in Boston. For the: purpose of 
notifying him of his sister's death the respondent made 
inquiry of two or three of the next of kin living in Lynn 
and was informed by some of them that a man named 
Comeau living in Lynn would probably know about the 
p·etitioner, James Welch. ·He asked them to see Comeau 
and make inquiry as to the whereabouts of petitioner 
and afterwards the wife of the respondent informed him 
that one of the next of kin had telephoned her saying 
that they had seen Come~au and that he had told them he 
did not know where the petitioner was. The respondent 
later went to the City Hall at Malden but could find no 
record of James Welch and he also wrote two of the 
next of kin in Nova Scotia but was unable to get any 
information from them regarding Welch. The respond-
ent did not make any examination of the city records in 
Boston. Comeau, as a matter of fact, had called upon 
petitioner at various times and did know where he lived 
but the respondent never p·ersonally saw Comeau or 
communicated with him directly. The respondent testi-
fied that he believed that p·etitioner had died without 
issue although he was not so informed by anyone who 
had actual knowledge of his death. The trial judge~ found 
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that the petitioner \Va~ entitled to one-fourth of the 
balance of the estate. 
The Court said at page 816: 
"The general rule is that those. acting in trust 
capacity must exercise not only good faith but 
also sound judgment in the performance of their 
duties. They must use that degree of intelligence 
and diligence \vhich a man of average ability and 
ordinary prudence under such responsibility 
":ould exercise in like circumstances. That rule 
finds its most frequent illustration in the invest-
ment of trust funds and the. management of trust 
estates. Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 
N.E. 665. Springfield Safe Deposit ·& Trust Co. 
v. First Unitarian Society (Mass.), 200 N.E. 541. 
The rule is not confined in its operation to those 
cases, but as shown by Cleveland v. Draper, 194 
Mass. 118, 80 N.E. 227, extends to an administra-
tor in respect to his conduct in making distribu-
tion of an intestate estate in conformity to a 
decree of court. 
"There is no express finding in the case at 
bar that the respondent was ne·gligent. The;re is 
the finding that the respondent acted honestly 
and in good faith. That, howeve-r, is. not enough. 
Not infrequently, trustees whose conduct has met 
that standard have been compelled to make good 
losses to the trust fund solely because of failure 
to exercise sound judgment in investments. There 
is no finding in terms that the respondent eon-
formed to the general rule of conduct just stated. 
It is found, however, that by exercising more. dili-
gence he might have located the petitioner, or 
ascertained that he was living. The facts found 
_and already narrated show that the respondent 
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was mildly active, if not actually slothful, in his 
atte1npt to locate the petitioner. He was de-
scribed in the respondent's petition for adminis-
tration as a brother of the intestate, resident in 
Boston. Of course that description did not estab-
lish the fact. Hopkins v. Treasurer & Receiver 
General, 276 Mass. 502, 177 N.E. 654. If that 
statement had come to the attention of the judge 
it can hardly be thought that the decree; of dis-
tribution would have been entered on October 17, 
1930. See· Withington v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 
237 Mass. 73, 78, 129 N.E. 418. The respondent 
did not personally see or communicate with, or 
even write to Comeau in Lynn, who in fact knew 
about the petitioner, but instead of making gen-
uine investigation, the respondent accepted an 
unreliable hearsay report that Comeau did not 
know the residence of the· petitioner. The re-
spondent did not examine· the city records of 
Boston. He did not seek information fron1 that 
source by letters of inquiry. He did not, so far 
as appears, write a letter to the petitioner ad-
dressed to Boston or even examine· Boston direc-
tories. He did not advertise. for him in Boston 
newspapers. He did not solicit knowledge: of hi1n 
from the police department of Boston, or ask its 
assistance to find him. The diligence of the re-
spondent falls far short of that disclosed by the 
administrator in Cleaveland v. Draper, 194 Mass. 
118, 80 N.E. 227. The respondent did nort bring 
the situation to the attention of the judge. The 
respondent occupied a position of trust with re-
spect to the petitioner. That position required the 
p:utting forth of every reasonable~ effort to dis-
cover him. Instead of making that industrious 
and pe.rsevering search, he took the responsibility 
of represe~nting to the court in substance and 
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effect, by presenting his petition for distribution, 
that the petitioner "'"as not in existence at the 
time of the death of the intestate and hence not 
entitled to share in her estate.'' 
In the rase of ill orris Y. illull,] -t-! N.E. 436. 
This is a case where the son of the decedent was 
appointed executor of his mother's. will which by the 
terms required that a legacy to the sister of the e~xecutor 
should be claimed within a two year p·eriod. The execu-
tor gave the statutory notices required and on p·etition 
for distribution stated: "I do not know the address of 
Myra ~lull and have not heard from her for more than 
four years past." Distribution was made to the Executor 
as the residuary legatee of the bequest which would have 
gone to the sister. 
The Court said: 
"So in the present instance, by naming her 
son as executor of the will, the testatrix undoubt-
edly meant that her executor woruld use thei knowl-
edge that he had of the whereabouts of his siste~r, 
growing out of the settle~ment ocf the £ather's 
estate, and endeavor in good faith to loc:ate and 
notify the plaintiff in error of the terms of her 
mother's will. 
"It is not conceivable that this mother in.:. 
tended that her daughter to whom she gave this' 
legacy, should be deprived thereof because she 
had no op~portunity to know of the fact of her 
mother's death and the running of the two-year 
period named in the will, and it is not to be sup-
posed that the mother intended that the son, her 
executor, should receive this le·gacy as a reward 
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of not having exercised all due diligence to follow 
up the information and means of information that 
he had relative to the whereabouts of his sister. 
"It is not to be lost sight of that this execu-
tor, by remaining silent, and simply complying 
with the letter of the will and the statute, pre-
vented his sister from learning of the death of her 
mother and claiming the legacy under the terms 
of the will. 
"Has he shown due diligence in the; premises 
in the light of the authorities and the record and 
undisputed facts in this case~ It cannot be denied 
that the conduct of Frank S. Mull, e~ecutor, mani-
fested a purpose on his part to do nothing and 
say nothing which might in any way aid the plain-
tiff in error in discovering her rights under the 
will of her mother. 
"It is true he claims to have written letters, 
which were returned to him; yet unfortunately 
they are not produced in evidence. And it is 
equally true that within two years he had settled 
his father's estate and had personal correspond-
ence with her, as well as correspondence, through 
her attorne~y, concerning settlement of that estate. 
His own attorney Frank Schnee, under date of 
April 3, 1917, sent a check, attached to a receipt 
therefor, for her $500 legacy in the estate of the 
father of the plaintiff and defendant in error. 
And under date of June 18, 1918, the same attor-
ney acting for defendant in error, sent a formal 
notice of the claims of F'rank S. Mull, executor 
of the estate of Michael Mull, against such estate. 
"This state of facts, as evidenced by this 
correspondence, the affidavits, etc., is not consist-
ent with the representations made: to the probate 
court in the final account filed January, 1920: 
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.. ~I do not kno"T the address of ~[~Trul Mull 
and have not heard fron1 her for 1uore th·an four 
years past. 
Frank s .. Mull.' 
--such representations to the probate court 
cannot be reconciled in good conscience with the 
duty which a trustee owes his trust. In view of 
the personal profit 'Yhich accrued to this defend-
ant in error by reason of his failure to use 'a 
greater degree of diligence in the discharge of 
his trust, we are of the opinion that his conduct 
amounted to a fraud upon his sister, the plaintiff 
in error, and that it is not conscionable to p·ermit 
such conduct to take refuge behind the fact that 
the letter of the will or the statute does not in 
terms direct greater activity upon his p~art." 
Plaintiffs and appellants contend that the· fraud 
which has been shown both upon the plaintiffs and the 
court heretofore is sufficient that the Decree of Distribu-
tion in the Estate of Charles Carson cannot be any pro ... 
tection for Loren G. Norton, his bondsmen or E. LeRoy 
Shields, executor of the estate of Grace Carson, de·-
ceased. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs and appellants contend that in this case 
on the first point that the judgment is contrary to the 
evidence and that Grace Carson could not have been a 
widow, claiming to have been married hetwee.n 1923 and 
1919 in South Dakota, at which time the decedent Charles 
Carson was residing first at Vetal, South Dakota until 
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about 1922 and then in Chicago, Illinois until1927. Grace 
Carson was hound by her proof of marriage as being 
a legal marriage and the evidence disclosed rebuts any 
presumption that there was a legal marriage by which 
she could have been a widow and heir. Upon that par-
ticular theory Grace Carson's entire case would fall as 
it clearly would come directly within the holding of the 
case of Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Comp·any. 
As to the third point involved, plaintiffs and appel-
lants contend first, that there is no argument as shown 
by the evidence that both Grace Carson and Loren G. 
Norton the administrator, knew of the existence of two 
children by conversations prior to the: death of the de-
cedent; secondly, the failure of Grace Carson by her 
denials in her petitions and objections filed in the various 
causes which were consolidated, to admit at any place 
that the·re were any known children and the collaboration 
of Grace Carson with Loren G. Norton in which he did 
not show good faith with the· court by remaining silent 
both before and after his appointment as administrator. 
Thirdly, that neither the defendant Loren G. Norton nor 
Grace Carson never did give any notice of any kind 
during any of the probate proceedings to the plaintiffs; 
that Loren G. Norton failed to pubiish a legal notice~ to 
creditors and failed to give any notice upon obtaining 
two Orders for widow's allowance and failed to give, any 
notice, except posting of notices on final distribution of 
the estate to E. LeRoy Shields as executor of the Estate 
of Grace Carson, deceased. Further, the failure of Loren 
G. Norton to inventory $300.00 of assets or inform the 
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court at the tin1e of setting of his bond, which monies 
had been paid to Grace Carson between the de·ath of 
Charles Carson and his appointment on July 22, 1949, 
is an extrinsic fraud, and lastly the fact that Loren G. 
Norton ""'"ell knew that he and his wife, Gloria Norton, 
were the residuary beneficiaries of the Estate of Grace 
Carson, deceased, at the date of the filing of the First 
and Final Account of the Charles Carson Estate., and 
that they would materially gain by not making any dis-
closures of any known heirs. That Loren G. Norton, 
administrator, had the advice of counsel and acted direct-
ly contrary to and in the very teeth of the duty imposed 
upon him by law and by the bond that provided for 
"faithfully executing the duties of the trust according 
to law." Further, that Loren G. Norton never did re-
quest the instruction of the court at any stage of the 
proceedings as to what investigation to make or type 
of notice to give when he had knowledge of two pur-
ported heirs, which shows the arbitrary manner in which 
the guise of the procedure of the court was flaunted with 
and particularly to say nothing of the gain that would 
be made by the N ortons in not making such disclosures 
to the court. 
We respectfully contend that Grace Carson, Loren 
G. Norton, administrator and E. LeRoy Shields as exe-
cutor of the Estate of Grace Carson, deceased, have 
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not acted in good faith eithe,r to the appeUants and the 
plain tiffs or the corurt in the handling of this matter 
and have be,en guilty of extrinsic fraud sufficient to 
justify the intervention of a court of equity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
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